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Introduction

Over three-quarters of a century ago, one of the worst race riots in the
United States took place. On May 31, 1921, up to three hundred AfricanAmericans were killed,' thousands were left homeless, 2 and the predomi-

nantly Black Greenwood community was burnt to the ground by a white3
mob, deputized by the City of Tulsa and aided by the State of Oklahoma.

Many riot victims-traumatized and homeless-could not pursue legal recourse. 4 Those who did were stymied by a judicial system 5 infected by the Ku
Klux Klan 6 and undermined by local and state government that hid evidence
and promised restitution that never came. 7 The truth about the government's
1" Danney Goble, Final Report of the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot
of 1921, in OKLA. COMM'N TO STUDY THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921, TULSA RACE RIOT: A
REPORT BY THE OKLAHOMA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF

1921, at 1,

12-13 (2001) [hereinafter TULSA RACE RIOT]; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN.tit. 74, § 8000.1.2-.1.3
(West 2002).
2 Robert L. Brooks & Alan H. Witten, The Investigation of Potential Mass Grave Locations for the Tulsa Race Riot, in TULSA RACE RIOT, supra note 1, at 123, 123 (stating that approximately 11,000 African-Americans lived in Tulsa in 1921, most of them in the Greenwood
community); Goble, supra note 1, at 16 (1256 homes burned).
3 Goble, supra note 1, at 11-12; see also Scott Ellsworth, The Tulsa Race Riot, in TULSA
RACE RIOT, supra note 1, at 37, 64 (stating that up to 500 white males were sworn in by the
police as "Special Deputies," one of which had been given the specific instruction to "[g]et a gun
and get a nigger"); 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission-Creation, No. 1035, 1997 Okla. Sess.
Laws 2834 (describing "wide-scale attack" on Greenwood property and on innocent Greenwood
men, women, and children; including "assault, aggravated assault, arson, battery, trespass against
persons and property, false imprisonment, malicious destruction of property, attempted murder,
murder, and manslaughter").
4 See Letter from Eric D. Caine, Dep't of Psychiatry, Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., to

Michael D. Hausfeld, Attorney, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld, and Toll, Washington (Aug. 25, 2003)
("[Flew would have had the psychological resources to vigorously pursue restitution in court"
shortly after the riot, and such actions would have "seemed foolhardy to most in that era."),
appended to Brief in Support of Defendant City of Tulsa's Motion to Exclude the Report and
Testimony of Dr. Eric D. Caine at 11, 14-15, Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133-E(C)
(N.D. Okla. Nov. 19, 2003); cf Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 544 (1989) (concluding that be-

cause inmates "loathe" to bring constitutional claims against supervisors while still confined, this
justifies extending time period for filing).
5 See Goble, supra note 1, at 13-14 (noting that not a single criminal act has ever been
prosecuted by any level of government and, in fact, the municipal government initially tried to
impede Greenwood's rebuilding); see also tit. 74, § 8000.1.3 ("[T]here were no convictions for
any of the violent acts against African-Americans or any insurance payments to African-American property owners who lost their homes or personal property as a result of the Tulsa Race
Riot.").
6 Goble, supra note 1, at 11 (concluding that "within months of the riot Tulsa's Klan
chapter had become one of the nation's largest and most powerful" and that during the 1920's
"many of the city's most prominent men were klansmen"); see Alfred L. Brophy, Norms, Law,
and Reparations: The Case of the Ku Klux Klan in 1920s Oklahoma, 20 HARV. BLACKLETrTER

L.J. 17, 40-45 (2004).
7

See Tulsa,

THE NATION,

June 15, 1921, at 839 (quoting former Tulsa Mayor and head of

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 74:68

complicity in the riot 8 did not surface until roughly eighty years later, with
the historic publication of the Tulsa Commission Report ("Commission Report").9 Although the government conceded moral culpability, 10 it refused to
provide reparations to riot victims or their descendents, prompting them to
file suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on
February 24, 2003,. for violation of their constitutional and federal civil
rights. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs

2
were barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations.1
The Tulsa case is not unique. Unfortunately, this pattern of racial violence,' 3 and the concomitant denial of a legal remedy, has repeated itself in
the welfare board, Loyal J. Martin, as stating, "Tulsa weeps at this unspeakable crime and will
make good the damage, so far as it can be done, to the last penny"); A Grand Jury Riot Probe:
And Tulsa Business Men Will Rebuild Negroes' Homes, KAN. Crr STAR, June 3, 1921, at 1;
Tulsa Is Repentant Now, KAN. CrrI STAR, June 3, 1921, at 6; Citizens to Help Rebuild "Little
Africa," TULSA DAILY WORLD, June 3, 1921, at 8; Tulsa Will, TULSA TRIB., June 3, 1921, at 5;
Niles Blames Lawlessness for Race War, TULSA TRIn., June 2, 1921, at 4 (quoting Alva J. Niles,
President of the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce) ("The sympathy of the citizenship of Thlsa, in a
great wave has gone out to the unfortunate law abiding negroes who became victims of the
action and bad advice of some of the lawless leaders and as quickly as possible rehabilitation will
take place and reparation made.").
8 See tit. 74, § 8000.1.2 (citing "strong evidence that some local municipal and county
officials failed to take actions to calm or contain the situation once violence erupted and, in some
cases, became participants in the subsequent violence" and "even deputized and armed many
whites who were part of a mob that killed, looted, and burned down the Greenwood area"); see
also Goble, supra note 1, at 11-12.
9 See Goble, supra note 1, at 6-8; tit. 74, § 8000.1.2 ("Official reports and accounts of the
time that viewed the Tulsa Race Riot as a 'Negro uprising' were incorrect.").
10 Goble, supra note 1, at 19; tit. 74, § 8000.1.6 ("The 48th Oklahoma Legislature ...
recognizes that there were moral responsibilities at the time of the riot which were ignored and
has [sic] been ignored ever since rather than confront the realities of an Oklahoma history of
race relations that allowed one race to 'put down' another race. Therefore, it is the intention of
the Oklahoma Legislature . . . to freely acknowledge its moral responsibility on behalf of the
State of Oklahoma and its citizens that no race of citizens in Oklahoma has the right or power to
subordinate another race today or ever again.").
11 The plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on February 28, 2003, see First
Amended Complaint at 1, Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133-E(C) (N.D. Okla. Feb. 28,
2003), and their Second Amended Complaint on April 29, 2003, see Second Amended Complaint at 1, Alexander, No. 03-CV-133-E(C) (N.D. Okla. Apr. 29, 2003).
12 See Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *37
(N.D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2004). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on similar grounds to the district court. See Alexander v. Oklahoma,
382 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004). The Tenth Circuit then denied the plaintiffs' petition for
rehearing en banc. Alexander v. Oklahoma, 391 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying en
banc review), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257 (2005). The dissent's arguments to the denial of en
banc review mirror some of those made in this Article. See id.
13 For example, similar race riots have taken place in Wilmington, North Carolina (1898);
Helena, Arkansas (1919); Elaine, Arkansas (1919); Atlanta, Georgia (1906); and Sherman, Texas
(1930). See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1051, 1061 (2003). Race riots were not limited to the South. They also occurred in Springfield,
Missouri (1906); East St. Louis, Illinois (1917); Chicago, Illinois (1919); Washington, D.C. (1919);
and Rosewood, Florida (1923). See id.; Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for
Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 94-96 (2004) (comparing to
Tulsa); ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921:
RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION 111 (2002).
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communities throughout the United States. The Tulsa case is just one example of government-sanctioned collective violence going unpunished because
of a procedural hurdle-the statute of limitations. Japanese Americans interned during World War II and Jewish survivors of the Holocaust have also
struggled to clear this hurdle.
Despite the history of government-sanctioned violence, courts reject
reparations claims; and many Americans support these decisions. People are
incredulous and unsympathetic to the notion that African-Americans could
present claims and seek relief for events that took place decades ago, if not
longer. The courts-expressed recently in the Tulsa case-routinely dismiss
such claims despite the ability to exercise their discretion otherwise.
Reparations litigation is at a critical juncture; the viability of a reparations lawsuit has once again become the focus of intense and serious debate.
There is no dearth of scholarship on the broad issue of reparations, 14 but
little has been written on the narrow but essential question of whether, as a
14 See generally DERRICK
2004); BORIS I. Br-KER, THE
AMERICA

PAY?:

51-56 (5th ed.
3 (2d ed. 2003); SHOULD
REPARATIONS 3 (Raymond A.

BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW
CASE FOR BLACK

SLAVERY AND

Winbush ed., 2003); F. MICHAEL
QUESTIONS 167-72,241-42 (2001);

REPARATIONS

THE RAGING DEBATE
HIGGINBOTHAM,

ON

RACE

LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY,

AND

R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 97, 244, 260-66 (2000); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT:
WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 1 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1177, 1177 (2004); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking ConservativesSeriously: A
Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 685 (2004);
Andrew Kull, Restitution in Favorof Former Slaves, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1277, 1277 (2004); Alfreda
Robinson, Troubling "Settled" Water: The Opportunity and Peril of African-American Reparations, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 139, 139 (2004); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial
Justice on Trial-Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror,
101 MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1269 (2003); Roy L. Brooks, Rehabilitative Reparationsfor the Judicial
Process,58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 475, 475 (2003); Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptualand
Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 497 (2003); Lee
A. Harris, "Reparations"as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations,33 U. MEM. L.
REV. 409, 409 (2003); F. Michael Higginbotham, A Dream Revived: The Rise of the Black Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 447, 447 (2003); Emma Coleman Jordan, A
History Lesson: Reparationsfor What?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557, 557 (2003); Ogletree,
supra note 13, at 1051; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Reparationsfor the Children of Slaves: Litigating
the Issues, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 245, 245 (2003); Anthony J. Sebok, Reparations,Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 651, 651 (2003); Christian Sundquist, CriticalPraxis,Spirit Healing, and Community Activism: Preservinga Subversive Dialogue on Reparations,58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 659, 659
(2003); Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African-American Reparations to Redirect
America's Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689, 1689 (2002); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive US. Our
Debts?: Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2531 (2001); John McWhorter,
Against Reparations:Why African Americans Can Believe in America, NEW REPUBLIC, July 23,
2001, at 32; Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own FrontDoor: Examining the
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 677 (1999);
Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1657 (1999);
Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?,
19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 429 (1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:Japanese
American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 477 (1998); Rhonda V.
Magee, Note, The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up, 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 864 (1993); Vincene
Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 597, 598 (1993); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 323 (1987).
JOE
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matter of current public policy, it is legitimate to apply outmoded notions of
the statute of limitations to such litigation while simultaneously refusing to
consider modem bases for expanding permissible exceptions to the application of statutes of limitations. This Article fills that void, focusing on the
limitations issues within the reparations debate.
Some limited work has been done on both sides. Proponents argue that
reparations claims should survive limitations periods and be adjudicated on
the merits because they fall within commonly recognized exceptions 15 or fall
completely outside of law governed by temporal restrictions. 16 At the heart

of arguments for the adjudication of claims so remote in time is the principle
of restorative justice. Proponents assert that government has a duty to do
justice and give restitution to victims of racial violence for their losses. 17 Opponents argue that reparations claims should be time-barred because their
8
age complicates the identification of the parties, causation, and remedies;
compromises deterrence; 19 undermines repose;20 and does not warrant
15 See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 13, at 91-93 (discussing the unavailability of courts as a
typical basis for tolling limitations period as compelling argument in Tulsa case); Keith N. Hylton, A Frameworkfor Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 31, 41-43 (2004) (discussing the discovery rule for accrual of claims and equitable tolling in reparations context); Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations:The Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 26-27
(2004) (discussing the applicability of equitable tolling doctrine in reparations cases); Adjoa A.
Aiyetoro, Formulating Reparations Litigation Through the Eyes of the Movement, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. Am. L. 457, 469-71 (2003) (discussing continuing violations as means of overcoming
limitations restriction in reparations cases); Morris A. Ratner, Factors Impacting the Selection
and Positioningof Human Rights Class Actions in United States Courts: A PracticalOverview, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 623, 626-29 (2003) (discussing continuing violations and equitable
tolling as useful sources for tolling statutes of limitations in reparations cases); Matsuda, supra
note 14, at 380-85 (citing applicability of "standard exceptions" such as disability, continuing
wrong, and fraudulent concealment as bases for permitting reparations claims that would otherwise be time-barred).
16 See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 13, at 93 n.29 (discussing legislation as an alternative means
of extending the statute of limitations in reparations cases); Aiyetoro, supra note 15, at 469-71
(characterizing slavery as a crime against humanity and therefore not subject to statutes of limitations under international law); Ratner, supra note 15, at 626-29 (discussing treaties and legislation as useful sources for tolling statutes of limitations in reparations cases); Burt Neuborne,
Holocaust Reparations Litigation: Lessons for the Slavery Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 615, 621-22 (2003) (suggesting political programs as a means for addressing
reparations claims).
17 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14, at 707-09; Martha Minow, Foreword: Why Retry? Reviving Dormant Racial Justice Claims, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1133, 1135-37 (2003); Margaret M.
Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1225, 1225-27 (2003);
Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 1334-37.
18 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 1185 ("[T]he basic theory of the statute of limitations" is
that "the passage of time is, in general, a reliable proxy for the increased complexity of events.");
Hylton, supra note 15, at 38; Calvin Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politicsof Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 157, 161-66 (2004) (describing how passage of time
makes determination of duty, causation, and damages more difficult in slavery reparations
cases).
19 See Hylton, supra note 15, at 38.
20 Epstein, supra note 14, at 1183; see Ogletree, supra note 13, at 1054-55 ("The victims'
families and communities are told to 'get over it,' even by the citizens of the towns still traumatized by their history of racial and ethnic violence as well as by black and white critics of reparations around the country."). Opponents also make numerous arguments unrelated to statutes of
limitations. See DAVID HOROwrrz, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS
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equitable treatment.

This Article argues that time-barring reparations claims is against public
policy for several reasons. First, under existing policy rationales for statutes
of limitations and their exemptions, such claims could survive. Second, the
courts should exercise their equitable powers more broadly to permit reparations claims to be heard on the merits. Third, some of the values underlying
statutes of limitations upon which the courts rely are outmoded and inapplicable in the context of reparations litigation. The Tulsa case is illustrative:
the district court interpreted plaintiffs' injuries and their causation in an
overly simplified and ahistorical manner, inappropriately held plaintiffs to a
far greater standard than due diligence, and permitted defendants to avoid
liability through deception.
Part II of this Article describes the underlying policy rationales for An-

glo-American statutes of limitations. Part III illustrates the underlying rationales for exceptions to the limitations period and the doctrine used to

implement such exceptions. Using the Tulsa case as an exemplar, Parts IV
and V analyze the propriety of courts' dismissal of reparations as timebarred. Specifically, Part IV critiques the application of doctrine commonly
used to exempt the limitations period, and Part V critiques the underlying

limitations policies and whether they are served by barring reparations
claims.
I.

Policy Reasons for Statutes of Limitations

Although limitations periods have been a fixture in the American legal
system for centuries, 2 2 in general, little modem scholarship has questioned
the continued validity of their underlying purposes. 23 This void, recognized
FOR SLAVERY 12-16 (2002); David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations.forBlacks Is a Bad
Idea for Blacks-and Racist Too, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Jan. 3, 2001, http://www.front
pagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=1153; see also Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War
over Reparationsfor Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1201-02 (2004) (categorizing the opposition to reparations).
21 Epstein, supra note 14, at 1184.
22 See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879); Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1950); Harry B. Littell, A Comparison of the Statutes
of Limitation,21 IND. L.J. 23, 23 (1945) (noting that from the Limitation Act of 1623 to modem
times, limitations periods have existed in England and the United States); Thomas E. Atkinson,
Some ProceduralAspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 CoLtnM. L. REV. 157, 157-76 (1927)
(describing history of law of limitations).
23 Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Though rarely the subject
of sustained scholarly attention, the law concerning statutes of limitations fairly bristles with
subtle, intricate, [and] often misunderstood issues .... "); Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, supra note 22, at 1185 ("So firmly have statutes of limitations become imbedded in
our law in the course of centuries that legislatures seldom reconsider them in the light of the
various functions that they actually perform; the delicate process of adjustment is left to rationalization and interpretation by the courts."). For current scholarship on the purposes of statutes of
limitations, see, e.g., CALVIN W. CORMAN, LITrrATION OF AcnoNs § 1.1, at 11-17 (1991); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 172-75 (2001); Tyler T. Ochoa
& Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAc. L.J. 453, 454-55
(1997) (exploring limitations system in California). For prior scholarship on the purposes of
statutes of limitations, see, e.g., Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16
OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 130-39 (1955); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note
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by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes at the turn of the twentieth century, 24 remains today. Justice Holmes's question, "what is the justification for depriving a man of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the
lapse of time? '25 continues to puzzle judges, scholars, lawyers, and lay persons today.
The dearth of scholarship on the rationales for limitations periods and
their concomitant exceptions is troubling.26 The absence suggests that inertia
may be at work, a notion that Justice Holmes correctly found disturbing:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.27
Are the federal courts currently implementing limitations rules where
significant grounds for such rules have long since vanished? Reparations litigation is a perfect test case. It presents both the starkest example of a stale
claim (i.e., it may be decades old or longer) and, at the same time, the most
egregious circumstances under which equitable principles would conceivably
apply (i.e., state-sanctioned violence and discrimination). Reparations litigation thus provides an important lens through which scholars may examine the
policy rationale for our limitations system. After examining the most egregious cases, we may find the notion of permitting such cases to go forward far
less incredible than first conceived. By examining the most common underlying policy rationales given for limitations law, we may come to realize that
the goals the law is meant to serve are not being served-or, more important,
that the goals themselves are less important relative to other societal values.
Central to limitations law is society's recognition that there must be
tradeoffs for a just and orderly legal system to prevail. 28 Here, the tradeoff is
between two countervailing goals: permitting claimants to resolve all claims
substantively on the merits, on the one hand, and prohibiting untimely claims
from being heard, on the other. Numerous policies are served by each goal.
29
Although particular statutes of limitations may serve specific purposes,
the general law of limitations has been justified by the federal court system as
22, at 1185-86; Littell, supra note 22, at 38; John R. Mix, State Statutes of Limitation: Contrasted
and Compared, 3 ROCKY MTN.L. REV.106, 106-17 (1931).
24 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897).
25 Id.
26 This observation has not escaped the notice of others. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra

note 23, at 454 (noting surprise at the dearth of scholarship given importance of statutes of
limitations in American and other legal systems for thousands of years); Developments in the
Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 22, at 1185.
27 Holmes, supra note 24, at 469.
28 Cf Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (describing the contrast
between those rules valuing stability and those valuing flexibility).
29 The modem American limitations law consists of general statutes of limitations found in
each state that fix time periods for various actions. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 22, at 1179. There are also special statutes that govern specific actions between specific parties. Id. Federal statutes may have their own limitations periods, but where a
cause of action arises under a federal statute enacted after December 1, 1990, which is silent on
limitations, a general federal four-year statute of limitations applies. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley &
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serving primarily three major purposes: providing fairness to the defendant,
promoting efficiency, and ensuring institutional legitimacy. 3
A.

Fairness to the Defendant

The courts articulate an overriding desire to make sure defendants are
treated fairly as one justification for limitations law. 31 This desire is
expressed primarily through three overarching mechanisms: (1) provid33
ing repose for the defendant; 32 (2) promoting accuracy in fact finding;
and (3) curtailing plaintiff misconduct. 34
First, at the heart of the law of limitations, is the primacy of repose, or
providing peace for the defendant. Claims, even those that are meritorious,
are cut off at some arbitrary point in time to protect a defendant's well-settled expectations that he will not be held accountable for misconduct after a
certain period of time has elapsed. The slate should be wiped clean 35 and the
Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 372, 374 (2004) (discussing the four-year "catchall" statute of limitations,
28 U.S.C. § 1658(a)). For all other federal statutes silent on the issue, the court borrows the
most analogous state statute of limitations and tolling rules if they are not inconsistent with the
federal statute or its goals. Id. at 377-80.
30 The courts, however, have been underinclusive in their recognition of the myriad policy
reasons for the law of limitations. See, e.g., Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 455 n.14. Few
articles offer a broad framework for how the underlying policy rationales for statutes of limitations are organized, with the exception of Tyler T. Ochoa and Andrew J. Wistrich's The Puzzling
Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, supra note 23. My Article sets out an alternative organizational scheme based on an examination of United States Supreme Court case trends.
31 Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants."); see Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S.
345, 352-53 (1983) (noting that statute of limitations is designed to provide notice to defendant
of adverse claim); see also Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, supra note 22, at
1185 ("The primary consideration underlying such legislation is undoubtedly one of fairness to
the defendant.").
32 See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002) (repose); Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S.
549, 555 (2000) (same); Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (protecting settled
expectations); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980) (protecting defendants from
claims arising out of actions "long past"); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980)
("peace of mind"); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Guar. Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938) (repose); United States v. Or. Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299
(1922) (same); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (same); Levy v. Stewart, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 244, 249 (1870) (same); United States v. Wiley, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 508, 513-14 (1870)
(same); Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868) (same); Bell v.
Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828) (same).
33 See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (preservation of evidence); Tomanio, 446
U.S. at 487 (reliability of witness testimony); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (protecting against "loss of
evidence"); Or. Lumber Co., 260 U.S. at 299 (statutes actually "supply the place of evidence lost
or impaired by lapse of time by raising a presumption which renders proof unnecessary"); Wood,
101 U.S. at 139 (preservation of evidence); Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
57, 70 (1873) (same); Riddlesbarger, 74 U.S. at 390 (same); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
532, 538 (1867) ("[Djeficiency of proofs aris[e] from the ambiguity and obscurity or antiquity of
transactions.").
34 See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874) (preventing fraudulent claims by
plaintiff); Riddlesbarger,74 U.S. at 390 (promoting due diligence); Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 290, 295-96 (1866) (protecting defendant from "unjust and harassing litigation").
35 Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, supra note 22, at 1185.
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defendant provided repose. 36 "Statutes of limitations . . . are designed to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber . . .,37
Repose is attractive because it protects everyone, in that each individual
is a potential defendant-the innocent and guilty alike-and therefore every-

one benefits from immunity from suit. 38 Protecting repose also advances
larger institutional interests that implicate economic, political, and social relations. Defendants, for example, benefit greatly from the knowledge that
they are immune from suit and their potential concomitant financial obligations. 39 With a limitations system intact, institutions can engage in commercial transactions unencumbered by the risk of litigation and able to structure
and plan their affairs. 40 Given the greater interdependency and globalization

more significant
of individuals and institutions today, repose plays an even
41
role in providing stability and certainty on a macro level.
Second, statutes of limitations are designed to favor the defendant by
requiring the plaintiff to bring his claim early enough to enhance the accuracy
of the evidence. Plaintiffs are not permitted to revive claims so old that the
"evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. ''42 This prohibition stems from the notion that it would be fundamentally unfair for the plaintiff not to give the defendant sufficient notice to
properly defend himself.43 This policy rationale is founded on the logical pre-

mise that over time evidence deteriorates; the longer a plaintiff waits to bring
a case, the greater the likelihood that evidence will be compromised:
36 "Repose" is defined as "freedom from something that disturbs or excites: CALM, PEACE,
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1926 (1993). Some
TRANQUILITY."

scholars have chosen to define "repose" for purposes of statutes of limitations as the composite
of four concepts: "(a) to allow peace of mind; (b) to avoid disrupting settled expectations; (c) to
reduce uncertainty about the future; and (d) to reduce the cost of measures designed to guard
against the risk of untimely claims." Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 460; see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (8th ed. 2004) ("Cessation of activity; temporary rest").
37 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
One scholar suggests that this emphasis on cultivating peace of mind stems from the early concept of amnesty and from Western cultural values rooted in Christianity-values such as forgiveness and reform. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 460 n.34, 460-61 (citing HENRY THOMAS
BANNING, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE STATUTE LAW OF LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 2 (London,
Steven & Haynes 2d ed. 1892)); 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 81 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1923) (1895).
38 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 460-61 & n.34.
39 See id. at 466-68; see also Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 672 (1986) ("A sound system of rights
resolves [conflicts] early in the process to reduce the legal uncertainty in subsequent decisions on
investment and consumption.").
40 See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879); 1 CoRMAN, supra note 23, § 1.1, at 16
("Certainty and finality in the administration of affairs is promoted.").
41 Davila v. Mumford, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 214, 223 (1860) (noting repose for "society").
42 Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348-49.
43 Id. at 349 ("The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."); Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R.,
380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
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The process of discovery and trial which results in the finding of
ultimate facts for or against the plaintiff by the judge or jury is obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in question is relatively fresh. Thus in the judgment of most legislatures and courts,
there comes a point at which the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a
claim is sufficiently likely

. . .

to impair the accuracy of the fact-

finding process ....
44
Consequently, as the United States Supreme Court concluded in Wood
v. Carpenter,4 5 at some point the plaintiff's delay forecloses her cause of action altogether: "While time is constantly destroying the evidence of rights,
[statutes of limitations] supply its place by a presumption which renders
proof unnecessary. Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a
conclusive bar. The bane and antidote go together." 46

Third, the limitation of actions ensures fairness towards the defendant
by monitoring the plaintiff's conduct. Limitations law tries to do this by: (1)

preventing fraud;4 7 (2) promoting diligence; 48 and (3) leveling the playing
49
field between the parties.

First, statutes of limitations seek to protect the defendant from fraudulent claims by making it harder for plaintiffs to file claims based on evidence
whose accuracy cannot be checked. The presumption underlying this policy
is that the older evidence is, the harder it is to verify. Thus, if there is no
restriction on when a plaintiff may file, she may intentionally file a frivolous
claim remote in time, knowing that its frivolity cannot be proven. Otherssuch as witnesses-may engage in revisionist history, knowing that their false
testimony cannot be easily challenged.
Second, although the courts recognize promoting diligence on the part of
the plaintiff as an underlying goal of limitations law, they are divided over

whether this goal is designed to discourage apathy or to enforce other collat44 Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980), modified on other grounds by
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117
(1979) ("[Statutes of limitations] protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with
cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by
death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise."); Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828) ("[Statutes of limitations] afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or be
incapable of explanation, by reason of the death or removal of witnesses.").
45 Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879).
46 Id. at 139.
47 Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99
(1982); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874) (preventing fraudulent claims by
plaintiff); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 538 (1867).
48 See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 550, 555-58 (2000) (encouraging prompt prosecution); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam) (promoting
diligence); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1983) (statute of limitations
designed to "prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights"); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 257 (1980); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 ("encourage the prompt presentation of claims"); Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (promoting plaintiff diligence); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396
(1946) (due diligence); Wood, 101 U.S. at 139 (due diligence); Hanger, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 538.
49 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 484-85.
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eral goals. 50 Statutes of limitations may be designed to "stimulate to activity
and punish negligence. ' 51 The courts seek to promote the cultural value of
diligence on the part of the plaintiff. As Justice Holmes observed, "[I]f a
man neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the
law follows his example." 52 Therefore, limitations law is punitive and normative in nature.5 3 Statutes of limitations may also be designed to ward against
of protecting other interests, such as repose
dilatory conduct only as a means
54
and evidence preservation.
Requiring plaintiff diligence may also have the collateral effect of deterring defendant misconduct. To the extent that prompt enforcement of the
substantive law promotes such deterrence, 55 encouraging plaintiff diligence
makes sense. Given that plaintiffs are often relied upon as private attorneys
general to enforce substantive rights, a6 policy requiring plaintiffs to file
5
quickly enhances deterrence objectives.

Third, the limitations law aims to equalize the opportunity for defendant
and plaintiff to prevail in litigation. This is done by requiring the plaintiff to
give the defendant sufficient notice to gather evidence while it is still fresh,
57
thereby maximizing the latter's ability to mount the best defense possible.
At the heart of this policy is the concern that plaintiffs will engage in what
50 See Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488-89.
51 Wood, 101 U.S. at 139; see also Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 352 ("Limitations
periods are intended ... to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights."); Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1943) ("Statutes of limitation ...
are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber."); 1 HORACE

G.

WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMrrATION OF AcrIONS

8-9 (4th ed. 1916) ("The statute of limitations . . . is intended to run against those who are
neglectful of their rights, and who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the enforcement
thereof.").
52 Holmes, supra note 24, at 476.
53 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 489-90; see also Nathan Kahan, Statutes of
Limitations Problems in Cases of Insidious Diseases: The Development of the Discovery Rule, 2 J.
PROD. LIAB. 127, 136 (1978) ("[Sltatutes of limitations are today viewed as punitive, as opposed
to protective. Their primary purpose is considered to be punishment for the slumbering plaintiff
and not protection for yesterday's wrongdoer.").
54 See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 965, 981 (1988) ("This explanation for statutes of limitations can only be
Unless the
justified as an instrument for furthering one or more of the [other] purposes ....
indolence of the plaintiff has somehow threatened the quality of the evidence available at trial or
intruded on a potential defendant's repose, no purpose, other than generally punishing the slothful, is served by barring the claim.").
55 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 492-93; Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543
(1989).
56 See Hardin, 490 U.S. at 543; see also Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 492 n.175
(citing Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868) ("The policy of these
statutes is to encourage promptitude in the prosecution of remedies.")). Of course, deterrence is
based on various other factors, including "the level of enforcement, the accuracy of adjudication,
the severity of punishment, and the promptness with which punishment is imposed." Ochoa &
Wistrich, supra note 23, at 492-93.
57 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) ("Limitations periods
are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims."); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740, 751 (1980) ("The statute of limitations ... recognizes that after a certain period of time
it is unfair to require the defendant to attempt to piece together his defense to an old claim.").
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Professor Ochoa and Judge Wistrich cleverly call "time shopping.158 That is,
plaintiffs, when given the chance, will purposefully gather helpful evidence in
preparation for filing suit, while unsuspecting potential defendants will discard, disregard, or fail to preserve evidence helpful to their defense. 59

B. Efficiency
At the center of limitations law is the desire not only to protect defendants, but to promote efficiency in our legal system.6° The objective is not
lofty; it is very pragmatic. Statutes of limitations are justified as efficient because they: (1) reduce costs; (2) clear dockets; 61 and (3) simplify judicial

decisions.
First, limitations periods reduce transaction costs brought about by evidentiary concerns. In general, the more remote in time a claim is, the greater
those concerns may be. The policy rationale for limiting claims based on
time is that stale claims cost more-in terms of time, money, and resources62
to gather the relevant evidence and to resolve related admissibility issues.
For cases involving very old claims, the cost of finding witnesses, documents,
and other reliable evidence to reconstruct the past may be exorbitant or,
even worse, prohibitive.
63
Limitations law may also reduce the costs associated with uncertainty.

For example, in the absence of a limitations period, an institutional defendant
may pay more for liability insurance than it would otherwise. 64 Such an allocation of resources may be unnecessary and better spent elsewhere. In the
face of uncertainty, a defendant might also incur significant costs preserving
and retaining documents over a long period of time, in case such documents
will be needed as evidence in future litigation. 65 This, too, is inefficient.

Second, statutes of limitations are being used as a means of alleviating
the burgeoning dockets the federal courts are laboring under today. 66 Belea58
59

See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 484.
See id. at 484-85.

60 See 1 CommA,, supra note 23, § 1.1, at 16 ("Judicial efficiency is the reward when these
statutes [of limitations] produce speedy and fair adjudication of the rights of the parties.").
61 See Hardin, 490 U.S. at 543 (discussing balance between interest in disposing of litigation as quickly as possible and allowing claims to be heard on the merits); Davila v. Mumford, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 214, 223 (1860) (noting that one goal of statute of limitations is "preventing
litigation").
62 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 480-81; Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal
Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. Cm. L. REV.1175, 1182 (1986) ("The passage of time is positively
correlated with both of the costs just identified: the expense of litigation and the error rate.");

Peter V. Letsou, Comment, A Time-Dependent Model of Products Liability, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.

209, 227 (1986) ("[A]ny liability rule ... becomes more costly and difficult to enforce over time.
The passage of time magnifies uncertainty and evidentiary problems."); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort
Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 534
(1984) ("[D]elay leads to decay of evidence, blurs the chain of causation, adds multiple defendants, and hence increases litigation expense.").
63 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 468-71.
64
65

See id. at 469.
See id. at 470-71.

66 This, in fact, is not a new concept. The Supreme Court has long recognized the role
statutes of limitations can play in preventing litigation. See Davila, 65 U.S. at 223 (in the context
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guered by heavy case loads, the courts67 may find reprieve in being able to
dismiss outright some cases solely on procedural grounds. 68 Statutes of limitations thus serve as a clearinghouse, reducing the number of filings in the
court system.
Moreover, statutes of limitations are used to reduce the number of undesirable claims-such as those that lack merit or curry disfavor with the legislature. 69 Courts justify eliminating stale claims under the long-held belief
that such claims are more likely to be unmeritorious than those brought on
time: "Statutes of limitation ... are founded upon the general experience of

mankind, that claims which are valid are not usually allowed to remain neglected. The lapse of years without any attempt to enforce a demand, creates, therefore, a presumption against its original validity, or that it has
ceased to subsist. ''70 The courts presume that if a plaintiff sincerely believes
that his case is strong and important, he will be more likely to bring it quickly
than to delay. The legislature may also enact a short limitations period in an
71
attempt to discourage litigants from pursuing certain types of claims.
Rather than changing the substantive law, the legislature may instead use
procedural hurdles-such as a limitations period-to discourage such claims.
A strict limitations period will have the effect of barring numerous claims
and clearing the federal dockets.
Finally, statutes of limitations promote efficiency by creating an easy
way for courts to determine what claims may be heard. Having a bright-line
rule is simple, fast, and predictable. By taking the guesswork out of the
court's determination, the judiciary's limited time and resources can be spent
elsewhere. The legislature's enactment and the courts' enforcement of limi-

tations periods provide administrative ease 72 essential to the smooth functioning of an increasingly complicated legal system.
of adverse possession, identifying one of the purposes of statutes of limitations as "preventing
litigation").
67 See, e.g., Rothensies v. Elec. Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 302-03 (1946) (describing tolling as a "menace to the statute of limitations" and expressing concern that tolling statute
for taxpayers seeking tax recoupment remedy "would depend on diverting the litigation to the
district courts").
68 See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("[T]he courts ought to be
relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights."). This
phenomenon is taking place in other ways as well. The Court's preference for enforcing predispute arbitration clauses and encouraging settlement, for example, also reduces the volume of
litigation on procedural grounds.
69 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 495-97.
70 Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 70 (1873); United States v.
Wiley, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 508, 513-14 (1870) ("Statutes of limitations ... are enacted upon the
presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not delay enforcing it beyond a reasonable time, if he has the power to sue."); Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386,
390 (1868); see 1 CoRmAN, supra note 23, § 1.1, at 13 ("When no attempt is made in a reasonable
time to enforce a demand, it is likely that a judicial presumption will arise against the original
validity of the claim or its continued existence."); Green, supra note 54, at 1003 n.164 ("The
assumption underlying this claim is that those with meritorious claims will be anxious to pursue
them and will therefore file suit promptly.").
71 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 499-500.
72 See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (discussing "federal interests in
uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation"); Rothensies, 329 U.S. at
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A bright-line rule that prohibits claims after a certain date provides the
parties and the courts with structure and clarity.73 Everyone is clear about
the rules of engagement, and plaintiffs will not conceivably "waste" the defendant's and the court's time by pursuing a claim remote in time. In the
absence of a concrete deadline, the courts would be free to decide whether a
claim is too remote in time based on political or spurious rationales. Left to
its own devices, the court is unchecked by the legislature, raising separation
of powers concerns. There is a risk that if the bases for tolling are expanded
too much, the exception will swallow the rule.
In fact, the judiciary endorses the law of limitations for expedience's
sake, even where this results in injustice:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than
principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the
courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put
to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or
disappeared, and evidence has been lost.... They are by definition
arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the
74
just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay.
Thus, from a cost-benefit analysis, statutes of limitations serve an important utilitarian function; they operate as gatekeepers-permitting timely
claims in and keeping untimely claims out of the legal system. Limitations
periods create certainty that reduces transaction costs and saves time and
scarce resources.
C. InstitutionalLegitimacy

An unspoken yet important rationale for limitations law is its legitimizing function. 75 Statutes of limitations attempt to assure the public that decision making is rational. The courts permit claims to go forward on the basis
of clear rules rather than prejudice or excessive discretion. "[S]trict adherence to the procedural requirements" enhances an "evenhanded administration of the law."'76 To the extent that the public believes that limitations law
serves important and legitimate goals (such as bolstering the reliability of
evidence, preventing fraudulent claims, and curtailing judicial waste), limita301 (prohibiting a taxpayer from seeking recoupment of claim for tax refund long after statute of
limitations had expired was an "almost indispensable element of fairness as well as of practical
administration of an income tax policy").
73 See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002).
74 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see also United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) ("It goes without saying that statutes of limitations often make
it impossible to enforce what were otherwise perfectly valid claims. But that is their very purpose, and they remain as ubiquitous as the statutory rights or other rights to which they are
attached or are applicable."); Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947) ("[Pleriods [of limitation] are established to cut off rights, justifiable or not.").
75 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 481-83.
76 Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (per curiam) (quotation omitted); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 108 (2002).
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tions law 77reinforces and strengthens the legal system's institutional
legitimacy.
In summary, the reasons for statutes of limitations are varied and complex. Admittedly, the rationale for the law of limitations is complicated and
fails to be neatly categorized. 78 The controversy over the effect of limitations
law, especially in the context of reparations, continues to perplex. As a result, the courts and Congress have carved out numerous exceptions to the
application of limitations periods. Part III sets forth the major underlying
policy rationales given for exempting certain claims from time bars.
III.
A.

Policy Reasons for Exceptions to Statutes of Limitations and
the Mechanisms for Their Implementation

Policy Rationales for Exceptions to Limitations Periods

Notwithstanding the myriad benefits of limitations law, deeming claims
to be time-barred creates angst within the Anglo-American legal system for a
host of reasons. First, statutes of limitations deprive citizens of one of the
most fundamental rights upon which our legal system is based-the right to
be heard. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the primacy of this
value, established by the United States Constitution: "The due process clause
requires that every man shall have the protection of his day in court, and the
,,79 Ask
benefit of the general law, a law which hears before it condemns ....
any citizen what he or she expects from the legal system, and the answer will
be his or her proverbial "day in court."80 So entrenched is this notion of
entitlement that deprivation of access to the court system on procedural
grounds seems practically un-American. Depriving someone of the opportunity to be heard undermines fundamental notions of fairness and due process
that form the cornerstone of the legal system. As the Supreme Court recognized at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Marbury v. Madison,
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every indi81
vidual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.
Exemptions from limitations law thus protect a citizen's opportunity to vindicate his rights.
77 Limitations law also discourages courts from retroactively applying current legal and
moral standards on a defendant's past conduct, which may be perceived as unfair to the defendant. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 493-95.
78 Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 313.
79 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394 (1914)
("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to heard."); see also Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) ("If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a
plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his

claim on the merits.");

LAURENCE

H.
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666 (2d ed.

1988) ("[There is] intrinsic value in the due process right to be heard" because "[w]hatever its
outcome, such a hearing represents a valued human interaction in which the affected person
experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in the decision that vitally concerns her.").
80 See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.7, at 311 (4th ed. 1992) ("Another characteristic American value is the right to have one's say, specifically, to have one's 'day

in court."').
81 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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83

The injustice of not having access to the court system because of an arbitrary cutoff is particularly acute where a claim is meritorious. Denying a
claimant relief where moral culpability has been established violates the fundamental concept that "for every wrong there is a remedy." 82 The notion of
applying a time bar-where the plaintiff has been diligent and the defendant
has not been prejudiced-seems illogical and unjust. 83 Not surprisingly, the
courts have considered the merits of stale claims when determining whether
to exempt them from limitations periods.84 Such consideration, however, is
fundamentally unfair to the defendant because he risks having to defend himself with unreliable evidence-one of the very things the limitations period is
designed to avoid. 85 The courts must pick their vice: unfairness to the aggrieved plaintiff or unfairness to the culpable defendant. When confronted
with this choice, some courts may understandably prioritize the injured party
86
over the wrongdoer and permit remote claims to escape the time bar.
Second, exemptions from statutes of limitations ensure that procedural
mechanisms do not supercede the enforcement of substantive law. A fundamental objective of the Anglo-American legal system is that disputes be resolved on their merits and not on procedural grounds. 87 Where this is not the
case-and the merits are subordinated to "technicalities"-a collective groan
is often heard. 88 Exemptions from the statutes of limitations are important
because they ensure that the substantive law is being enforced and that misconduct is deterred. Cutting off meritorious claims because of a time bar
risks underenforcement and lack of deterrence. 89
Third, permitting old claims to be heard bolsters the institutional legitimacy of the legal system. Although clear rules attempt to signal that judicial
decisions are rational, a wooden and inflexible application of such rules undermines institutional legitimacy. Shutting legitimate claims and blameless
Stringer v. Young's Lessee, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 320, 330 (1830).
See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 18-19 (1990) (describing injustice as
"the refusal to recognize valid claims"); Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 505 (describing
injustice as "[f]ailure to provide compensation where morally it is held due") (quotation omitted)); Christopher H. Schroeder, CorrectiveJustice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA
L. REv. 439, 450 (1990) (noting that "victims must be made whole" for corrective justice).
84 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 509.
85 Id.
86 See ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 162 (1987) ("It is ... not
tolerable or acceptable that the innocent should suffer and the wicked not pay for their misdeeds."); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3, 4-5 (1955) ("The state of affairs
where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does
not; and it is better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.").
87 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 500-01; FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note
80, § 1.1, at 2 ("In its day-to-day application, the law of procedure implements substantive
law."); ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 99 (1990) ("A decisionmaker" prefers to make decisions
"squarely on [the] merits.").
88 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 27 (1993) ("No one ... feels satisfied when a decision announced is based on what seems to be a legal technicality instead of on
the real issues.").
89 See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543 (1989) ("[I]f the official knows an act is unconstitutional, the risk that he or she might be haled into court indefinitely is more likely to check
misbehavior than the knowledge that he or she might escape a challenge to that conduct within a
brief period of time."); Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 506.
82
83
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plaintiffs out of the legal process creates disaffection and disillusionment with
the legal process:

[N]o democratic political theory can ignore the sense of injustice
that smolders in the psyche of the victim of injustice. If democracy
means anything morally, it signifies that the lives of all citizens matter, and that their sense of their rights must prevail. Everyone deserves a hearing at the very least ....90

If victims of injustice are selectively deprived the benefits of the laws,
citizens may come to view the legal system as ineffective, unfair, and illegitimate. As a result, they may resort to extrajudicial remedies and self-helpeven violence.

Allowing litigants the opportunity to present stale claims also gives victims an opportunity to seek recourse where there may be no other options.
Through complex litigation-such as nationwide class actions and multidistrict litigation-the judiciary can solve problems left unresolved by the legislative and executive branches. 91 Indeed, some court decisions and courtmonitored agreements implement policies the other branches are unwilling
or unable to address.92 Access to the courts is particularly important for minorities, the poor, lower socioeconomic classes, and other disenfranchised
groups who must rely on the legal system for protection of basic human and
civil rights. Such groups lean on the legal system for relief because of the
unresponsiveness of the legislative and executive branches. 93 Informal mech-

anisms within the legal system, such as alternative dispute resolution and settlement, may be fraught with risk and biased against such groups. 94 In fact,
the federal judicial system has often protected minorities and other disen-

95
franchised groups from the tyranny of local government and private actors.

This safety net provides some measure of comfort and stability.
90

SHKLAR,

supra note 83, at 35.

91 See HERBERT JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA

41 (3d ed. 1978). The judiciary plays an

important role in the political process, as this commentator notes:
It opens another avenue for seeking favorable decisions for those who are unsuccessful with the legislature or the executive. If a group fails to capture or hold a
legislative majority, and if it fails to elect its candidate as chief executive of the state
or nation, it may nevertheless seek to alter public policy through litigation.
Id.
92 In an effort to address systemic problems not adequately addressed by the legislature,
such as asbestos, tobacco, and other mass torts, the courts have attempted to play a greater and
more creative role. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Creative Use of ADR: The Court-Appointed Special Settlement Master, 59 ALB. L. REV. 881, 881-93 (1996) (discussing use of "new creative case
management techniques aimed at the comprehensive resolution of... complex litigation"); Jack
B. Weinstein & Karin S. Schwartz, Notes from the Cave: Some Problems of Judges in Dealing
with ClassAction Settlements, 163 F.R.D. 369, 379-85 (1995) (discussing expanded role of judges
and special masters). But see Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: JudgeJack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2010, 2012-33 (1997) (discussing
whether judicial role has been expanded too far).
93 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 502-03.
94 Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV.1359, 1391 (discussing risks minorities face in
alternative dispute resolution).
95 See, e.g., England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 427 (1964) (Douglas,
J., concurring) ("[Flederal judges appointed for life are more likely to enforce the constitutional
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Fourth, to the extent that the judiciary plays a larger role than merely

resolving disputes-and instead develops and articulates public values-limitations law deprives society of meaningful discourse and growth. 96 Exemptions overcome this. Judicial opinions legitimize outcomes and convince
others of their propriety, not just explain decisions.97 The courts promote,
influence, and reflect cultural values and moral norms. Exemptions from
limitations law appropriately promote the courts' role as educator and culture disseminator.
Finally, exemptions from statutes of limitations are justified to promote
fairness to the plaintiff and deter defendant misconduct. Time bars are often
exempted because of a defendant's conduct, a plaintiff's status, or a legal
prohibition. For example, where a defendant has impeded a plaintiff from
filing suit by fraudulently concealing the cause of action, the plaintiff is not
required to file suit until she knew or should have known of the cause of

action. 98 Similarly, where a defendant induces a plaintiff not to bring suit and
the plaintiff reasonably relies on that inducement, the defendant is estopped
from asserting the statute of limitations defense. 99 The same is true if the
defendant explicitly waives the defense. The underlying policy rationale for
this exemption is to prevent a defendant from escaping liability through de-

ception or misrepresentation. 100 Because the plaintiff is either unable to sue
or has been reasonably duped into not suing, the limitations exemption does
not undermine the goal of promoting plaintiff diligence.
Like the defendant, the plaintiff is also scrutinized. A plaintiff's statuswhether legally disabled or even dead-will have an impact on whether a

limitations period is exempted. 10 1 Legal disabilities that exempt plaintiffs
rights of unpopular minorities than elected state judges."); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.").
96 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984); William H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. Rv.
29, 93 ("[T]he trial is an end in itself in the same way that religious rituals and artistic performances are not means to ulterior purposes but are intrinsically valuable."); Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 699, 711 (1969) ("The legal assertion
of a claim is a political event, sometimes a significant one, even if the claim is rejected. In our
tradition it is thus a function in fact if not in concept for the courts to be forums for political
grievance.").
97

Cf SOLAIN,

supra note 88, at 1-3.

98 See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 22, at 1220-22,
1236-37.
99 Id. at 1222-24.
100 Additionally, where a defendant absences himself, the courts will sometimes suspend
limitations periods in an effort not to penalize the plaintiff for the defendant's conduct. See id. at
1224-29, 1235-36; see, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
equitable tolling applicable where former Philippine President made himself immune from suit
while in office); Cleghorn v. Bishop, 3 Haw. 483, 483-84 (1873) (holding statute of limitations
was tolled until after death of King Kamehameha V where the King was immune from suit
during his lifetime).
101 See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 22, at 1220, 1229-33.

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 74:68

from time bars include infancy, insanity, imprisonment, and coverture. 10 2
The disability must exist at the time the cause of action accrues and, generally, does not stop the limitations period once it has started running. 10 3 The
underlying policy rationale for this exemption is to prevent a defendant from
fortuitously benefiting from a plaintiffs hardship. 10 4
A legal prohibition may also suspend the limitations period. Where a
statute or injunction explicitly prohibits suit, the courts will exempt a plaintiff
from the limitations period. 10 5 The underlying policy rationale for this exemption is fairness to the plaintiff: "Where the plaintiff is prevented from
filing timely suit by force of law, it is manifestly unjust to penalize him by
barring the suit."' 1 6 Although rarer, "a factual, rather than legal, impossibility of bringing suit" is sometimes invoked by the courts.10 7 For example,
where the courts are closed to citizens of an enemy state during war, the
10 8
courts will suspend the limitations period.
There are numerous reasons why limitations periods are exempted. The
next section examines the most common ways in which the courts actually
implement those exemptions.
B.

Mechanisms for Exempting Claims from Limitations Periods
1.

Accrual

A court's determination of when a cause of action accrues impacts
whether a plaintiff may successfully bring a claim remote in time. Accrual is
the moment when a plaintiff may bring a cause of action. In other words, a
"cause of action 'accrues' when a suit may be maintained thereon, and the
law in this regard differs from state-to-state and by nature of action." 10 9 It is
at this point that the proverbial clock begins to run.
a.

The Discovery Rule

In general, the clock begins to run not on the date an injury has occurred,110 but on the date that the plaintiff discovers or should have reasonably discovered the injury.11 1 In most jurisdictions, this discovery rule has

replaced the more restrictive rule that a tort claim accrues at the time of
102 See Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 538-39 (1867) (infancy, imprisonment,
coverture); United States v. Wiley, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 508, 508 (1870) (infancy, insanity,
coverture).
103 See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 22, at 1229-30.
104 See id. at 1233.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1234.
108 Id.
109 BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 21 (6th ed. 1990).
110 Justice Scalia, in a concurrence in Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., identifies the possibility of
an "injury occurrence" rule in which discovery of the injury would be irrelevant. Klehr v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 198 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has left this
question open. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 n.2 (2000).
111 Federal courts generally apply the discovery accrual rule where a federal statute is silent
on the issue. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555; Klehr, 521 U.S. at 191; 1 CORMAN, supra note 23, § 6.5.5.1,
at 449.
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plaintiff's injury.' 1 2 There are, however, various approaches to accrual which
are even more liberal than the general discovery rule-e.g., a cause of action
may not be triggered until something other than the initial injury is
discovered.

113

There is an ongoing debate over just how malleable the concept of accrual should be. On the one hand, accrual has been liberalized. The amount
of time a plaintiff has to bring a claim has expanded-from the date of injury
to the date plaintiff actually or constructively discovered the injury. On the
other hand, accrual has been constricted. The amount of time a plaintiff has
to bring a claim has contracted-from the date of discovery of the last predicate act or pattern of misconduct to the date of injury. The Supreme Court is
openly wrestling with the propriety of various accrual approaches-based
largely on the type of claim that is being asserted and the statute being
114

enforced.

There is no uniform application of the discovery rule; it varies according
to the type of claim and circumstances. The propriety of the discovery rule is
governed by the Court's own subjective determination of which claims "cry
out" for its application. 115
112 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120, 121 n.8 (1979); see also Green, supra note
54, at 977 (noting that "[v]irtually all commentators and the vast majority of courts" have
adopted a discovery accrual approach because of its fairness).
113 The Supreme Court has recently had occasion to evaluate such liberal discovery rules
and rejected them on the grounds that they violate the underlying purposes of limitations periods. See, e.g., Rotella, 528 U.S. at 553-55, 558 (rejecting the "injury and pattern discovery rule"
in the context of civil action brought under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"); Court anticipated the rule would lead to claims very remote in time, and concluded
that the policies of limitations law-"repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty"-would
be undermined); Klehr, 521 U.S. at 187-90 (rejecting the most liberal accrual discovery rule, the
"last predicate act rule," in the context of a civil RICO claim); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117-18,
122-24 (rejecting a more lenient accrual rule in the context of a medical malpractice case, despite plaintiff's contention that tolling was justified due to the technical complexity of the case,
because the primary purpose of the limitations period-encouraging plaintiff diligence-would
be undermined).
114 See Green, supra note 54, at 978 (identifying various formulations of the discovery rule);
see, e.g., Nat'l. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 123-24 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that discovery rule applies to discrete acts of employment discrimination
but noting that "courts continue to disagree on what the [plaintiff] notice must be of' (quotation
omitted)); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27-28 (2001) (foregoing application of the discovery rule to claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act where statute had its own enumerated
bases for accrual and where Court concluded claim was not in "an area of the law that cries out
for application of a discovery rule"); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that in most commercial cases accrual was appropriate at the time of injury, but in
medical malpractice cases accrual was appropriate at the time a diligent plaintiff discovered facts
revealing an invasion of legal rights).
115 Some Justices interpret the Court's exercise of discretion in this area as judicial activism:
"These cries, however, are properly directed not to us, but to Congress, whose job it is to decide
how 'humane' legislation should be-or (to put the point less tendentiously) to strike the balance between remediation of all injuries and a policy of repose." TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 37-38
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). "'[T]he cases in which [the statute of limitations may be
suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute itself] are very limited in character, and are to
be admitted with great caution; otherwise the court would make the law instead of administering
it."' Id. at 38 (quoting Amy v. Watertown (No. 2), 130 U.S. 320, 323-24 (1889)).
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The Continuing Violations Doctrine

Similar to the discovery rule, the continuing violations doctrine allows a
plaintiff to bring a cause of action where there is a continuous series of injuries that stem from an initial injury.116 The doctrine permits a plaintiff to
obtain relief for a time-barred act of misconduct by connecting it to similar
acts of misconduct that occurred within the limitations period. 117 The courts

treat the series of acts as one continuous act that ends before the statute of
limitations period expires. "[T]he statute of limitations is not tolled per se,
but rather left open until a final injury has accrued. ' 118 The continuing violations doctrine is applicable to various types of "serial violations"'119 in both
the criminal and civil context. 120
Application of the continuing violations doctrine centers on the distinction between discrete acts and continuous ones,'12 1 and between a continued
violation and the continued impact of a single violation. 122 The continuing
violations doctrine is an important component of the accrual analysis. The
Supreme Court has recognized its particular importance in ensuring the
proper enforcement of civil rights laws. 123
116
117
118

See Nat'l R.R. PassengerCorp., 536 U.S. at 106-07.
See id.
In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1071 (N.D. Ill.

2004).
119 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 114.
120 See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 134-35 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) ("The
'continuing offense' is hardly a stranger to American jurisprudence. The concept has been extended to embrace such crimes as embezzlement, conspiracy, bigamy, nuisance, failure to provide support, repeated failure to file reports, failure to register under the Alien Registration Act,
[and] failure to notify the local board of a change in address .... "); see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 536 U.S. at 115 (continuing violation within employment discrimination context).
121 In the employment discrimination area, the Supreme Court recognizes a hostile-environment claim as one that by its nature involves repeated conduct and therefore lends itself to
accrual under the continuing violations doctrine. Nat'l R.R. PassengerCorp., 536 U.S. at 114-15.
The unlawful employment practice takes place over a lengthy period of time and does not become actionable until the cumulative effect of various individual acts has taken place. Id. at 115.
In contrast, a discrete act of discrimination-such as a termination, promotion denial, or refusal
to hire or transfer-constitutes its own individual actionable unlawful practice and is subject to
immediate accrual. Id. at 114. The Court has been reluctant to extend the continuing violations
doctrine to ongoing antitrust violations or a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 127
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122 The Supreme Court had occasion to address this issue in Delaware State College v.
Ricks, where it held that the timeliness of an employee's Title VII and § 1981 claims were measured from the date the employee was terminated on the basis of national origin, not later. Del.
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980). In Ricks, the plaintiff accepted a one-year "terminal" contract following his denial of tenure. Id. at 253-54. He argued that this date prolonged
the limitations period. Id. at 257. The Court, however, was unpersuaded, holding that continuity
of employment alone did not prolong the life of his employment discrimination action. Id.
Neither did the plaintiff's pending grievance toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 261. The Court
concluded that the moment the employer made the tenure decision and communicated it to the
employee was the moment the discriminatory act occurred and the limitations period started.
Id. at 258. Even though the employee did not experience the impact of the discriminatory act
until later, this did not push back accrual. Id.
123 Id. at 262 n.16 ("We recognize, of course, that the limitations periods should not commence to run so soon that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil
rights statutes."); see also Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982).
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Equitable Estoppel

Once a statute of limitations has begun to run, it may still be arrested by
two tolling doctrines: equitable estoppel and equitable tolling.124 Equitable

estoppel prohibits a defendant from being able to invoke the statute of limitations defense where he has taken active steps to prevent a plaintiff from
timely filing.125 A defendant may do this by inducing a plaintiff not to timely
file (often by promising not to plead the statute of limitations defense) or by
trying to fraudulently conceal his wrongdoing.12 6 The key attribute 127
of the
equitable estoppel exemption is active misconduct by the defendant.
3.

Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling permits a court to suspend the running of a limitations
period for equitable reasons. 128 Equitable tolling does not require wrongdoing by the defendant. 129 So long as the plaintiff has exercised due diligence, it
124 The tolling doctrines are distinct from the discovery rule. The discovery rule states that
the statute of limitations does not actually start to run until the plaintiff becomes aware or
should have become aware of her injury. The tolling doctrines state that once the statute of
limitations has already started running it can still be stopped. See Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83
F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1996).
125 See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990); Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946) ("[F]raudulent conduct on the part of the defendant
may have prevented the plaintiff from being diligent and may make it unfair to bar appeal to
equity because of mere lapse of time.").
126 See Cada, 920 F.2d at 450-51. Fraudulent concealment may involve the defendant's
hiding his identify or other facts necessary for plaintiff to bring suit. Wolin, 83 F.3d at 850.
Fraudulent concealment should not be confused with a defendant's attempts at concealing fraud
in a fraud case. They are distinct. Where a defendant successfully conceals a fraud, this pushes
back the date of accrual because the plaintiff cannot discover the injury-pursuant to the discovery rule. Cada, 920 F.2d at 451. Fraudulent concealment, however, means that the cause of
action has already accrued. See id. The plaintiff has already discovered or should have discovered her injury, and the defendant has actively tried to prevent the plaintiff from timely filing
through fraudulent conduct. Id. The courts, however, have struggled to determine how distinct
the fraudulent concealment must be from the original fraud. Wolin, 83 F.3d at 851.
127 Courts are split over whether a plaintiff still must be diligent in order to get the benefit
of this doctrine. Wolin, 83 F.3d at 852. Compare Martin v. Consultants & Adm'rs, Inc., 966 F.2d
1078, 1094 n.17 (7th Cir. 1992), and id. at 1102-03 (Posner, J., concurring), with J. Geils Band
Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1258 (1st Cir. 1996), and
Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land Co., 931 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Wood v.
Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 143 (1879) (requiring reasonable diligence where plaintiff seeks to toll
statute of limitations because of defendant's fraudulent concealment).
128 The doctrines of equitable estoppel (fraudulent concealment) and accrual (the discovery
rule) are distinct from equitable tolling. United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1056 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (noting that equitable tolling is distinct
from equitable estoppel and fraudulent concealment)); cf Cada, 920 F.2d at 451 (noting confusion between equitable tolling and both fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule); United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 94 n.10 (1985) (referring to equitable tolling and equitable estoppel
separately).
129 Cada, 920 F.2d at 451-52 ("Holmberg makes clear that equitable tolling does not require any conduct by the defendant." (citing Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 397)). But see Wolin, 83 F.3d
at 852 ("[W]hen the plea is equitable tolling rather than equitable estoppel, the defendant is
innocent of the delay..., so the plaintiff must use due diligence to be allowed to toll the statute
of limitations ....
).
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is immaterial whether the defendant is responsible for depriving the plaintiff
of information vital to the existence of his claim. 130 Equitable tolling means
that "the plaintiff is assumed to know that he has been injured, so that the
statute of limitations has begun to run; but he cannot obtain information necessary to decide whether the injury is due to wrongdoing and, if so, wrongdo'131
ing by the defendant.
Equitable tolling, although exceptional, is completely normal. 132 "Traditionally and for good reasons, statutes of limitation are not controlling measures of equitable relief. ' 133 As recognized recently by the Supreme Court,
the propriety of applying the equitable tolling doctrine is well accepted where
consistent with the text of the relevant statute. 134 The concept of tolling is so
commonplace that the courts must presume that Congress drafted limitations
135
periods with this operative principle in mind.
There are numerous grounds upon which the federal courts have found
it appropriate to apply the equitable tolling doctrine. The Supreme Court
has permitted equitable tolling: (1) where the plaintiff has timely pursued his
legal claim but filed an improper pleading; 136 (2) where the plaintiff was induced or tricked by his adversary into not timely filing his claim;137 or (3) in
other cases. 138 This third category provides considerable discretion and is
very broad. Under this "catch-all" exception, the Supreme Court has equita130 Cada, 920 F.2d at 451-52 (citing Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 397). Because application of
equitable tolling, unlike equitable estoppel, may involve two innocent parties, the courts may be
less forgiving of an untimely filing. See id. at 453.
131 Id. at 451.
132 See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (limitations are customarily subject to tolling); Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R.,
380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("This policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently
outweighed, however, where the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff's rights.").
133 Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396.
134 Young, 535 U.S. at 49 ("It is hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling ...." (quotation omitted)); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347,
349-52 (1997); see, e.g., Young, 535 U.S. at 50-51, 54 (permitting tolling during pendency of
Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions, where it was consistent with IRS three-year
lookback period); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 38 (1998) (prohibiting equitable tolling
on basis that plaintiff knew or should have known of violation and case involved ownership of
land); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974) (permitting tolling where it was
consistent with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Clayton Act's statutes of
limitations).
135 Young, 535 U.S. at 49-50.
136 See, e.g., Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 (timely but defective pleading filed); Burnett, 380 U.S. at
429-30 (timely but filed in wrong court); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962)
(filing of lawsuit showed sufficient diligence to overcome untimeliness on the basis of lack of
venue).
137 Young, 535 U.S. at 50; Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984)
(per curiam); Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 621 F.2d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1980);
Leake v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255, 259 (6th Cir. 1979); Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (tolling
appropriate where defendant misled plaintiff into believing he had more time to file).
138 Young, 535 U.S. at 50 (citing Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151 (listing
grounds for tolling)). Courts are less generous in providing equitable tolling where the dispute is
over land title. For example, in interpreting the propriety of equitable tolling under the Quiet
Title Act, the Supreme Court acknowledged the significance of land ownership in concluding
that the extension of additional time for tolling was unwarranted: "This is particularly true given
that the [Quiet Title Act] deals with ownership of land. It is of special importance that landown-
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bly tolled limitations periods for various reasons. For example, the Supreme
Court has expressed approval of equitable tolling where a plaintiff did not
have sufficient notice of her right to sue; 139 where a motion for appointment
of counsel was pending and equity required the motion to be ruled upon
prior to suit;140 and where the court led a plaintiff to believe she had done
everything necessary to bring suit.141 Equitable tolling has been permitted
where, despite due diligence, a plaintiff is unable to collect critical information related to the existence of his claim, 142 or where a plaintiff is rendered
unable to protect his claim during the statutory filing period. 143 For example,
if the courts are unavailable-as they often are during wartime-the courts
have equitably tolled the limitations period. 144 The doctrine is appropriate

under extraordinary circumstances 145 and when the underlying
purposes of
14 6
the statute of limitations have nonetheless been served.

ers know with certainty what their rights are, and the period during which those rights may be
subject to challenge." Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 49.
139 Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151 (citing Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974)).
140 Id. (citing Harris v. Walgreen's Distrib. Ctr., 456 F.2d 588 (6th Ci. 1972)).
141 Id. (citing Carlile v. S. Routt Sch. Dist. RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1981)).
142 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990); see, e.g., Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946).
143 In Young v. United States, the Supreme Court held that tolling was appropriate where
the "IRS was disabled from protecting its [tax collection] claim" during the pendency of the
taxpayer's bankruptcy. Young, 535 U.S. at 50-51. Given the historical equitable nature of bankruptcy court, the courts are more generous in providing equitable tolling where the dispute is
related to bankruptcy. For example, the Supreme Court recognized how customary it is for
courts to provide equitable tolling of limitations periods where it is consistent with the relevant
federal statute, especially where the case involves bankruptcy: "Congress must be presumed to
draft limitations periods in light of this background principle ....That is doubly true when it is
enacting limitations periods to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity and
appl[y] the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence." Id. at 49-50 (quotation omitted). A
defendant's failure to demonstrate that it was prejudiced by plaintiff's delay is not an independent basis for tolling, but a factor that may apply once another basis for tolling has been established. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151-52.
144 See, e.g., Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 183-85 (1872) ("It is unnecessary to go
at length over the grounds upon which the court has repeatedly held that the statutes of limitation of the several States did not run against the right of action of parties during the continuance
of the civil war."); Levy v. Stewart, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 244, 253-55 (1870) (holding that statute of
limitations was suspended during Civil War for claims to enforce contracts); United States v.
Wiley, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 508, 513-14 (1870) (holding that time during which courts were closed
because of Civil War is excluded from computation of time fixed by the statute of limitations for
suits brought by the government against citizens residing in rebellious states); Hanger v. Abbott,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 539-41 (1867) (holding that time in which courts were closed in Arkansas
because of rebellion was excluded from computation of time fixed by statute of limitations to
bring contract claims, even where statute did not provide for this exclusion); Burnett v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1965) (war as basis for tolling).
145 Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989).
146 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974) ("Since the imposition of a
time bar would not in this circumstance promote the purposes of the statute of limitations, the
tolling rule we establish here is consistent both with the procedures of Rule 23 and with the
proper function of the limitations statute."). In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the
Supreme Court held that the filing of a class action lawsuit tolled the statute of limitations for
putative class members who timely moved to intervene once class certification was denied on
numerosity grounds. Id. at 539. The Supreme Court concluded that this ruling was consistent
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In sum, there are as many reasons for carving out exceptions to limitations periods as there are for enforcing them. The courts have the power to
exercise discretion and flexibility in enforcing limitations periods, and the
legislature has the power to eradicate them altogether. The shelter of statand has come into law by legislative
utes of limitations is not guaranteed
147
grace, not as a natural right.

Given the various competing interests served by limitations periods and
their exemptions, one would expect significant decisional law and scholarship
on their application to reparations cases. Surprisingly, very little has been
written about this difficult issue. Part IV addresses this void by analyzing the
principles upon which the court in the Thlsa case recently dismissed riot victims' reparations claims as time-barred. Part V illustrates how under existing
norms for limitations exemptions, reparations claims should survive to the
merits.
IV.

The Court's Misapplication of Limitations Exceptions
in the Tulsa Reparations Litigation

The Tulsa case provides an interesting and important lens through which
one can critique the current propriety of courts' application of statutes of
limitations and their exemptions to reparations litigation. 148 The story of
Tulsa is a tragic example of the principle that justice delayed is often justice
denied. It tragically demonstrates the judiciary's failure to seriously examine
whether and how a procedural mechanism-the statute of limitationsshould be applied, given its myriad underlying purposes and exemptions.
with the functional operation of a limitations period because the policies of promoting fairness
to the defendants and encouraging plaintiff diligence were met; the defendants were sufficiently
put on notice of the nature and scope of the litigation, and the named plaintiff's timely filing of a
representative action demonstrated proper diligence. Id. at 553-56. Where the procedures of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the relevant limitations statute were met,
the Court permitted tolling. Id. at 555-56; see also Burnett, 380 U.S. at 434 ("Finally, the humanitarian purpose of the [Federal Employers' Liability Act] makes clear that Congress would not
wish a plaintiff deprived of his rights when no policy underlying a statute of limitations is served
in doing so."); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 473-76 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that tolling should be permitted for untimely
§ 1981 claim where plaintiff's timely Title VII charge gave defendant notice of claim, plaintiff
acted diligently, and defendant was not unfairly surprised or unable to collect and preserve evidence because § 1981 claim was identical to Title VII claim).
147 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988) ("[S]tatute of
limitations defenses are not a fundamental right .... ); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404,
408 (1982) (same); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) ("[Statutes of limitations] represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.").
148 A similar critique can be done of litigation where plaintiffs seek reparations for slavery
from private corporations. See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d
1027, 1038-44 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (seeking to hold eighteen present-day companies liable for the
commercial activities of their alleged predecessors before, during, and after the Civil War for
claims that arose out of the institution of human chattel slavery). Claims for reparationsfor
slavery and its vestiges are admittedly even more complex because of their greater remoteness in
time and the additional complications related to identification of the parties, causation, and injury. This critique is beyond the scope of this Article and will be explored in a subsequent
article.
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A.

The Story of Tulsa
149
On May 31, 1921, up to three hundred African-Americans were killed

and thousands left homeless15 0 after they were attacked by a white mob.
Deputized by the City of Tulsa, and aided by the State of Oklahoma, 151 the
mob burned the entire African-American community to the ground-destroying schools, churches, businesses, a hospital, and a library 152 in a prosperous community and business district affectionately called the "Negro's

Wall Street."'1 53 Civic leaders at the time promised reparations for one of the
worst race riots in United States history, condemned nationwide, but none
came.

154

Many riot victims-homeless, destitute, and terrorized-were in no position to pursue a judicial remedy at the time. 155 Other riot victims who sought
relief in the courts soon realized its futility156 because law enforcement and
the political process were infected by extremist organizations, such as the Ku
157
Klux Klan.

Moreover, city and state officials buried evidence and discouraged litiga58
tion, impeding riot victims from preparing the record needed to prevail.
159
Victims were buried in unmarked graves and the government failed to investigate or prosecute perpetrators for arson and murder. 16° Indeed, the African-American community of Greenwood was initially blamed for the
See supra note 1.
See Goble, supra note 1, at 12 (approximately 1256 homes burned or destroyed).
151 See supra note 3.
152 Goble, supra note 1, at 12; see also Larry O'Dell, Riot Property Loss, in TULSA RACE
RIOT, supra note 1, at 145, 149 (almost $2 million in 1921 dollars estimated in property damage
from the riot).
153 ScoTr ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921, at
22 (1982); see also Goble, supra note 1, at 12 ("Little Africa").
154 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
155 See Caine, supra note 4, at 5 ("Thus it is difficult (unto implausible) to imagine the
residents of Greenwood banding together and having the necessary individual or collective psychological strengths to sue for restitution in the courts of Oklahoma at that time, given what had
happened to them, as well as the social and legal environment of that era."); see also Brophy,
supra note 6, at 41-45.
156 Approximately 150 lawsuits were filed after the riot. Goble, supra note 1, at 7; see, e.g.,
Redfearn v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 243 P. 929, 931 (Okla. 1926) (denying recovery under insurance
policy for owner of theater and hotel burned to ground during riot). "[T]here were no convictions for any of the violent acts against African-Americans or any insurance payments to African-American property owners who lost their homes or personal property as a result of the Tulsa
Race Riot." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1.3 (West 2002). Instead, the government attempted to block rebuilding efforts in Greenwood. Id.
157 See supra note 6.
158 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission-Creation, No. 1035, 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws 2835
(creating the Tulsa Riot Commission and stating "black persons of that era were practically
denied equal access to the civil or criminal justice system in order to obtain damages or other
relief for the tortious and criminal conduct which had been committed"); see, e.g., Bell v. City of
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cit. 1984) ("Though [riot victim] Dolphus Bell filed a
wrongful death claim in state court soon after the killing, the cover-up and resistance of the
investigating police officers rendered hollow his right to seek redress .... ").
159 See Brooks & Witten, supra note 2, at 124-32 (exploring evidence of potential mass
graves based on geophysical study and eyewitness testimony).
160 See Goble, supra note 1, at 13-14 (noting that not a single criminal act has ever been
149
150
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riot. 161 Evidence was hidden or destroyed and talk of the riot's occurrence
squelched. 162 The suppression was so complete that the current and former

mayors of Tulsa had never heard of it. 163 Oklahoma history textbooks and
historical accounts of Tulsa excluded it.164 In such an environment, no litigants could successfully vindicate their claims.
Almost eighty years later, in an effort to address the conspiracy of silence 1 65 that surrounded the riot and its aftermath, the State of Oklahoma
commissioned a study of the riot.166 Based on over ten thousand pages of
materials, 167 some of which implicated the government in the riot and its aftermath, the Tulsa Commission ("Commission") issued a report, recommending reparations to riot victims. 168 Again, none came.
Armed with critical evidence never made available before,'169 over 130

survivors of the riot 170 sought relief in federal court, claiming that the governments of Tulsa and Oklahoma violated the Federal Constitution and various
federal statutes. 171 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the government
prosecuted by any level of government, and, in fact, the municipal government initially tried to
impede Greenwood's rebuilding); see also tit. 74, § 8000.1.3.
161 Ellsworth, supra note 3, at 69 (riot called "Negro uprising"); see also GrandJury Blames
Negroes for Inciting Race Rioting; Whites Clearly Exonerated, TULSA DAILY WORLD, June 26,
1921, at 1 (blaming group of African-American men for riot); Negroes Blamed for Race Riots,
TULSA DAILY WORLD, June 14, 1921, at 2 (describing a resolution passed by the Tulsa Silver
Plume Lodge Knights of Pythias, which stated that the riot was an "awful tragedy... [and] a
premeditated, unlawful uprising of a large number of armed negroes who.., without cause or
justification fired upon white men, women and children"); TULSA TRIB., June 14, 1921, at 2
(Mayor blaming negroes for "Negro uprising" and exonerating whites "in no uncertain language"); TULSA TRIB., June 4, 1921, at 88 ("[T]he bad niggers started it.").
162 See tit. 74, § 8000.1.4-.1.5 (riot was "virtually forgotten" for seventy-five years, which
changed after publication of the Commission Report). "Before there was this commission, much
was known about the Tulsa race riot. More was unknown. It was buried somewhere, lost somewhere, or somewhere undiscovered. No longer. Old records have been reopened, missing files
have been recovered, new sources have been found." Goble, supra note 1, at 8.
163 In 1996, then-Tulsa District Attorney (now Mayor) Bill LaFortune admitted, "I was
born and raised here, and I had never heard of the riot." John Hope Franklin & Scott Ellsworth,
History Knows No Fences: An Overview, in TULSA RACE RIOT, supra note 1, at 21, 25 (2001)
(quotation omitted). Former Mayor Susan Savage admitted the same. Sam Howe Verhovek, 75
Years Later, Tulsa Confronts Its Race Riot, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at A12.
164 Franklin & Ellsworth, supra note 163, at 26.
165 Id. at 25 (noting that important missing documents and reluctance to talk of the riot has
led some to conclude that nothing short of a "conspiracy of silence" existed regarding the riot).
166 Tit. 74, § 8000.1.5 (stating that work of Tulsa Commission has "forever ended the 'conspiracy of silence"').
167 Goble, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that amount of material "passed ten thousand pages
some time ago and well may reach twenty thousand by the time everything is done").
168 Id. at 15.
169 See id. at 6-8. The Commission concluded:
Until recently, the Tulsa race riot has been the most important least known event in
the state's entire history. Even the most resourceful of scholars stumbled as they
neared it for it was dimly lit by evidence and the evidentiary record faded more
with every passing year. That is not now and never will be true again.
Id. at 6.
170 As of February 28, 2001, there were 118 persons registered as living survivors of the riot
and 176 persons registered as descendants of riot victims. Id. at 6.
171 See Second Amended Complaint 1 1, Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133-E(C)
(N.D. Okla. Apr. 29, 2003).
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deprived them of their due process and equal protection rights in violation of
disthe Fourteenth Amendment and engaged in a policy of intentional 1race
72
crimination in violation of a number of federal civil rights statutes.
The court acknowledged the complexity and seriousness of whether such
claims should be adjudicated on the merits. 173 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the case, concluding that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute
of limitations. 174 The court admonished the defendants to take moral responsibility for their conduct in 75
the riot and its aftermath, even though legal responsibility was not found.
African-American riot victims-some over 100 years old-were told
once again that despite the Commission Report's conclusion of government
participation and culpability, the legal system would not provide a remedy.
Implicitly, the court concluded that because of the lapse of time, it was too
late for justice to be done.
B. Accrual

The district court gave short shrift to the main bases for exempting the
Tulsa plaintiffs' claims from the statute of limitations: accrual, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling. Although the court applied the discovery rule
of accrual, like other courts in similar reparations litigation,'1 76 it took an unnecessarily narrow and cramped interpretation of what constitutes the requisite injury and causation.
Where the plaintiffs sought reparations against state and municipal government for their alleged complicity in the Tulsa race riot of 1921, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge of their injuries such
that their various claims arising out of the riot accrued over eighty years ago.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they were insufficiently
aware of the City's complicity in the riot until the publication of the Commission Report in 2001,177 and concluded that it was "obvious" that victims of
178
the riot would have observed the City's misconduct during the riot.
The district court's analysis of what constituted the plaintiffs' injuries
and their cause is too simple. The court based its conclusion on the misguided notion that the plaintiffs' injuries were individual torts committed by
individual state actors, rather than an official government plan and policy to
deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional and statutory rights. The plain172 See id. 1$ 543-576. In addition to federal claims, plaintiffs also brought common law
claims under the State of Oklahoma's common law: promissory estoppel and negligence. Id.
577-594. The riot victims argued that they relied to their detriment on defendants' promise to
provide restitution for the riot, and negligence. Id.
173 Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *35-36 (N.D.
Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257 (2005).
174 Id. at *37.
175 Id. at *36.
176 See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1070-71
(N.D. I11.2004). But see Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing,
in dicta, some tolling doctrines in the context of the slave reparations case, but not addressing

accrual).
177 Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *25-28.
178

Id. at *26.
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tiffs alleged that the City of Tulsa organized, armed, and deputized white
citizens who then committed gross atrocities against the residents of Greenwood under color of law. 179 In the middle of perhaps one of the most brutal
race riots in American history, Greenwood residents would hardly have been
in the position to know that many of those who terrorized them were cloaked
under color of law. Many deputized whites who killed, looted, and burned
Greenwood to the ground did not wear badges or uniforms; their names were
not even recorded. 180 It is unreasonable to believe that riot victims would be
able to accurately ascertain the government's role in such mayhem-especially where the conduct plaintiffs challenge is not aberrant behavior by individual government officials, but an orchestrated plan by the government to
deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights.' 8'
The court further misunderstood various allegations in the complaint to
mean that the plaintiffs were aware of the defendants' misconduct. For example, the court concluded that riot victims "would have had to" observe the
improper conduct of the Oklahoma National Guardsmen and those citizens
deputized by the government. 18 2 But with only roughly 2% of the mobcomprising between 15,000 to 25,000 men-having been deputized, 83 it is not
at all clear that riot victims would have been able to identify the government's role. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs were aware of the
government's role in the riot on the basis of newspaper accounts shortly after
the riot, stating that Blacks condemned the actions of the Tulsa Police and
Oklahoma National Guard. 184 The plaintiffs' condemnation of the government for its laxity in policing, however, is not the same as the plaintiffs' recognizing the government's affirmative participation in the riot. 185 The court
seems to have mistakenly imputed knowledge the plaintiffs currently have
about the government's complicity-obtained from the Commission Report-to their knowledge within the limitations period. The Commission Report itself acknowledges the degree to which crucial information about the
government's role in the riot had never before been known or knowable. 186
Despite this concession, the court was unconvinced that accrual took place
on the date of the Commission Report's publication. 187
179 See Second Amended Complaint
469-471, Alexander, No. 03-CV-133-E(C) (N.D.
Okla. Apr. 29, 2003).
180 See Ellsworth, supra note 3, at 64.
181 See Goble, supra note 1, at 16-19 (concluding attack was on a community and riot was
designed to "keep one race 'in its place"').
182 Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *27.
183 See CHARLES F. BARRETr, OKLAHOMA AFTER FIFrY YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE
SOONER STATE AND ITS PEOPLE 1889-1939 (1941).
184 Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *26-28.
185 See Grand Jury Blames Negroes for Inciting Race Rioting; Whites Clearly Exonerated,
supra note 161 (noting "laxity of law enforcement on the part of the officers of the city and
county"); It Must Not Be Again, TULSA TRIB., June 12, 1921 ("Why were these niggers not made
to feel the force of the law and made to respect the law?"); Niles, supra note 7, at 4; Aide to
Police Answers Critics, TULSA DAILY WORLD, June 6,1921.
186 See Goble, supra note 1, at 6-8 ("Commissioners were surprised to receive so much new
evidence and pleased to see that it contributed so much ....
This commission's work changes
the game forever.").
187 See Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *24-28.
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The court's interpretation of what the plaintiffs should have known
about their injury and its source is devoid of context and reason. Holding
that the plaintiffs' actions accrued at the moment the riot unfolded fails to
account for the profoundly serious nature of the injuries and complexity of
their causes.
Other courts have appropriately recognized that plaintiffs often fail to
properly identify the parties responsible for misconduct or the precise causation because of inhospitable circumstances at the time.1 88 For example, in
actions dealing with FBI involvement in civil rights murders, the courts have
held that accrual did not take place until the victims' families discovered-as
many as twenty or thirty years later-the Bureau's complicity. 18 9 Similarly,
courts have concluded that plaintiffs' claims did not accrue until plaintiffs
learned of defendants' malfeasance in cases involving the government's role
in Cold War drug testing and syphilis experiments on nonconsenting victims. 190 Likewise, the notice requirement for plaintiffs in reparations cases
should be expanded because of the nature of the claim. As Mari Matsuda

aptly observed: "[T]he need for reparations arises precisely because it takes a
nation so long to recognize historical wrongs against those on the bottom.
Something other than a rigid conception of timeliness is required."'191
The Tulsa case also highlights the judiciary's limited view of what constitutes due diligence-the cornerstone of accrual and one of the fundamental

192
The Tulsa court, like others,'193
policy rationales for statutes of limitations.

was unpersuaded that plaintiffs who bring claims today for Jim Crow vio188 See, e.g., Anderson v. Cornejo, 199 F.R.D. 228, 251 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("A person may be
well aware that she was directly harmed by a specific person without having any knowledge that
it was part of a conspiracy, let alone knowing that a third party was aware of the conspiratorial
plans and could have prevented the injury."); Allred v. Chynoweth, 990 F.2d 527, 531 (10th Cir.
1993); Bergman v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 407, 419-22 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Peck v. United
States, 470 F. Supp. 1003, 1017-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
189 See, e.g., Liuzzo v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 1274, 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (holding
that where plaintiffs were in the unique position of not knowing about the government's complicity in their mother's murder until long after they knew of the injury, accrual did not begin
until an "investigation [was] both warranted and realistically possible"). Judge Posner reasoned
in a different context that "[w]hen there are two causes of an injury, and only one is the government, the knowledge that is required to set the statute of limitations running is knowledge of the
government cause, not just of the other cause." Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 59 (7th
Cir. 1985). Where a plaintiff knows of his injury but not the source, the cause of action does not
accrue. Id.
190 See, e.g., Cain v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 175, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Barrett v. United
States, 689 F.2d 324, 327-28 (2d Cir. 1982); Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304, 311-12
(M.D. Ala. 1974).
191 Matsuda, supra note 14, at 381.
192 Steven A. Bibas, The Case Against Statutes of Limitationsfor Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J.
2437, 2446-48 (1994).
193 Similarly, in recent consolidated litigation for slave reparations, the Northern District of
Illinois found it relevant to the question of whether plaintiffs had exercised due diligence that
"other former slaves were aware of their injuries and previously have attempted to recover for
them well before this action was filed." See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig.,
304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1071 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citing Johnson v. McAdoo, 45 App. D.C. 440, 441
(1916) (claim for slavery-based reparations brought nearly a century prior), affd, 244 U.S. 643
(1917)).
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lence exercised sufficient diligence when other riot victims filed suit much
earlier. 194

What should the relevance of such prior filings be? How much weight
should the court give to the fact that others were able to timely bring suit?
Although prior lawsuits do not as a matter of law put plaintiffs on notice of
their own claims, 195 such lawsuits suggest that plaintiffs may have been able
to bring suit earlier if they had made greater effort. This standard is unfair.
For no other types of claims do we hold plaintiffs to a superhero standard of
diligence. There are always those few exceptional people who are able to
overcome tremendous adversity and rise above no matter what the circumstances. The legal system, however, is designed not for the extraordinary, but
for the norm. Disturbingly, in the context of reparations, the objective reasonableness standard has been replaced with one far more rigorous. The fact
that some riot victims were able to bring suit within the limitations period
should not be determinative. 196

And where the parties are equally blameworthy (or blameless) it is unclear why plaintiffs should be the only ones to suffer. This question was considered in the context of whether statutes of limitations are fair to plaintiffs
who have art stolen from them but do not make claims for it until after the
limitations period has expired. Courts seem to be moving in a direction that
is more sympathetic to the original owners who bring untimely claims to recover stolen art rather than the bona fide purchasers of such art.197 This has

led some scholars to propose a wholesale 'retreat from statutes of limitations,
arguing that the discovery rule places an unfair burden on a diligent owner to
justify deferring the limitations period because he was unable to locate his
stolen chattel earlier. 198 Scholars analogize a plaintiff's blameless ignorance

of his claim to those disabilities that toll the limitations period, suggesting
194 Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *25-28 (N.D.
Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257 (2005).
195 See Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1533 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that existence of similar lawsuit does not put plaintiffs on notice of their own claims because lawsuit
could be "frivolous or baseless," and "defendants would have had to prove that the plaintiffs had
access to information that would independently verify the allegations" (quotation omitted));
Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 858 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); see also Bibeau v. Pac.
Nw. Research Found., 188 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that public records did not
put plaintiffs on notice as a matter of law).
196 Many of the prior lawsuits were unsuccessful, which deterred others from filing. Realizing the futility of such litigation, those who did not file within the limitations period may have
done so out of rationality, not slothfulness. For example, most of the lawsuits filed shortly after
the Tulsa race riot were against insurance companies who refused to honor their claims on the
ground that individuals, not the government, were responsible for the riot damage. Moreover,
the two cases actually litigated against the City of Thisa were dismissed. Black riot victims were
further dissuaded from filing suit against the government by grand jury indictments against
Blacks only. See supra note 156.
197 Bibas, supra note 192, at 2448, 2460 ("We have almost come full circle. In the nineteenth century, courts abandoned the common law's absolute protection of owners by adopting
adverse possession of chattels. That rule has eroded ever since, as courts have become increasingly concerned with fairness to theft victims and discouraging theft."); see also id. at 2449-50.
198 Id. at 2447, 2450-51. Bibas also criticizes the discovery rule as vague and inefficient. Id.
at 2450-51.
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that they should be treated the same.1 99 This makes sense in the context of
reparations too.
C. Equitable Estoppel

The Tulsa case illustrates the judiciary's overly narrow vision of what
circumstances justify equitable estoppel. 200 Despite the Commission Report's own admission that there existed a "conspiracy of silence" that kept
the plaintiffs ignorant of the facts surrounding the riot and its aftermathincluding the defendants' culpability-the court did not estop the defendants
from raising the limitations defense on the grounds of fraudulent concealment. The court also held the plaintiffs to an exacting standard on the question of whether the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the defendants' promise to
provide restitution-the alternative basis for equitable estoppel. The court's
limited analysis of equitable estoppel is unwarranted and inconsistent with
the underlying purposes of limitations law and its exemptions.
1.

Fraudulent Concealment

The Tulsa plaintiffs contended that the government fraudulently concealed its role in the race riot of 1921, thereby precluding them from timely
filing. 20 1 According to the Commission Report, which ultimately unearthed
the government's complicity in the riot, 20 2 the concealment was so thorough,
"[ilt was as if the greatest catastrophe in the city's history simply had not
'20 3
happened at all."
Designed to uncover hidden or suppressed information that could not
have been revealed otherwise, 204 the Commission Report is the culmination
of a four-year intensive study by a team of experts-including historians, legal scholars, archeologists, anthropologists, forensic specialists, geophysicists,
and others-who combed archival depositories and research libraries all over
the country; searched court and municipal records; extensively reviewed
magazines and newspaper outlets; and interviewed hundreds of survivors and
witnesses. 205 The Commission Report had a tremendous impact on the unId. at 2455.
[O]ne can draw an analogy between an innocent owner's ignorance and disabilities
such as infancy, insanity, and imprisonment, all of which toll the running of adverse
possession of land. In these cases, the law subordinates a possessor's repose to an
owner's fair chance to bring an action. Likewise, where an owner cannot bring suit
out of blameless ignorance of who has her chattel, the law should treat her ignorance as a disability and so toll the limitation period.
Id.; see also id. at 2456; Matsuda, supra note 14, at 381-82 (comparing injuries resulting from
slavery and its vestiges to legal disabilities that justify delayed accrual).
200 See also In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027,
1072-73 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (rejecting equitable estoppel in slave reparations case).
201 See Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 04-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *23-24
(N.D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), aff'd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2257
(2005).
202 See Goble, supra note 1, at 11-14; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1.2-.1.3
(West 2002).
203 See Franklin & Ellsworth, supra note 164, at 26.
204 See Goble, supra note 1, at 6-8; see also tit. 74, § 8000.1.5.
205 See Goble, supra note 1, at 1-4.
199
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derstanding of the riot and its aftermath: "Commissioners were surprised to
receive so much new evidence and pleased to see that it contributed so
much. "26
After decades of concealment, the Commission Report revealed the extent to which the defendants were complicit in the horror of the race riot and
its aftermath. Rather than calm or contain the riot, city officials deputized
and armed members of the white mob who deliberately burned, looted, and
killed. 20 7 Units of the Oklahoma National Guard arrested the Black residents of Greenwood and held them captive in holding centers, thereby enabling their homes, churches, schools, and businesses to be looted and burned
to the ground.20 8 No government official offered resistance or protection for
Greenwood; no criminal acts were prosecuted or punished; and Greenwood
residents were left to rebuild the community without assistance. 20 9
The Commission's findings were incorporated by statute by the State of
Oklahoma, which conceded that a "conspiracy of silence" had effectively
concealed information about the riot and its aftermath. 210 The record was set
straight. The State concluded that "[olfficial reports and accounts of the time
that viewed the Tulsa Race Riot as a 'Negro uprising' were incorrect," and, in
21
fact, government officials had participated in the violence and destruction. '
With the truth no longer "swept well beneath history's carpet, ' 2 12 the plaintiffs sought restitution from the government. Although acknowledging the
plaintiffs' allegations of fraudulent concealment-including the findings of
the Commission and the Oklahoma state legislature 213-the district court ignored this doctrine as a basis for equitable estoppel. Refusal to permit equitable estoppel under such circumstances is shortsighted. Other courts
understand this.
For example, in 1997, Jewish victims and survivors of the Nazi Holocaust, with their families and heirs, filed class action lawsuits against banking
institutions that operated in France during World War II, and their predeces214
sors and successors, for violations that occurred over fifty years earlier.
The plaintiffs claimed that the banks "aided and abetted and conspired with
Id. at 7.
Id. at 11-12.
208 Id. at 12.
209 Id. at 12-14.
210 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1.4, .1.6 (West 2002).
211 Id. § 8000.1.2.
212 Id. § 8000.1.4.
213 See Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *8-15,
*23-24 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), aff'd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2257 (2005). Specifically,
Plaintiffs argue that the City concealed its role in the Riot through the convening of
a Grand Jury that blamed the Riot on the victims, the failure to investigate the riot
or prosecute persons who committed murder or arson, and the disappearance of
official files from the Oklahoma National Guard, the County Sheriff, and the Tulsa
Police Department. Plaintiffs further support this argument with the language from
[title 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes], § 8000.1.4 referring to a "conspiracy of silence"
that "served the dominant interests of the state."
Id. at *24.
214 Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
206
207
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the Vichy and Nazi regimes" to loot the plaintiffs' assets, which promoted
discrimination against Jewish citizens and disabled them from being able to
finance their escape from Nazi persecution and avoid being sent to concentration camps where they were killed. 215 The plaintiffs alleged that, after the
war, the "defendants unjustly refused to return the looted assets, enriched
themselves with the derivative profits, and concealed information, value, and
derivative profits of the looted assets from the plaintiffs. '2 16 The plaintiffs
also accused the defendants of "misrepresenting to plaintiffs and the general
public [the defendants'] role during the Vichy government and their continued retention of assets; and failing to provide an accounting and restitution to
plaintiffs.

' 217

Various commissions were formed to provide relief to victims of the Holocaust-related atrocities, to supervise banking institutions' compliance, and
to conciliate amongst the parties. The primary commission was an independent one organized by the French government, "comprised of historians, diplomats, lawyers, and magistrates to 'study the conditions in which goods may
have been illicitly acquired... and to publish proposals' regarding redress of
Holocaust-era atrocities in France. '218 This commission generated a report
that provided substantial relevant evidence to the plaintiffs' case. 2 19 Consequently, the plaintiffs argued that "defendants should be equitably estopped
from raising a statute of limitations defense because plaintiffs have been kept
in ignorance of vital information necessary to pursue their claims without any
fault or lack of due diligence on the part of the plaintiffs. ' 220 The plaintiffs
contended that the defendants engaged in a "policy of systematic and historical denial and misrepresentation" and that such deception misled and de221
prived the plaintiffs from knowing or successfully proving their claims.
The court unequivocally accepted the plaintiffs' equitable argument, concluding that the defendants' deception should not permit them to hide behind the
statute of limitations:
Should the alleged facts be supported by evidence in discovery,
there is certainly a strong undercurrent to the issues at bar suggesting the [sic] a deceptive and unscrupulous deprivation of both
assets and of information substantiating plaintiffs' and their ancestors' rights to these assets. There is no reason that plaintiffs should
be denied a forum for addressing their claims as a result of deceitful
practices by the defendants which have kept them from knowing or
proving the extent of these claims, if that proves to be the case.
Defendants are not entitled to benefit from whatever ignorance

215

Id. at 121-22.

216

220

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

221

Id.

217
218
219

122.
123 (citation omitted).
123, 132.
135.
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they have perpetuated in the plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs are entitled

222
to the benefit of equitable tolling.
Despite the passage of fifty years, the plaintiffs were able to receive
some recompense for their misery. There is no reason why the same should
not be true for plaintiffs seeking relief for the atrocities of Jim Crow violence
223

in Tulsa.
When confronted with the question of whether there has been fraudulent concealment sufficient to equitably estop a defendant from relying on
the statute of limitations defense, the court must first ask what was concealed. What types of information fall under the fraudulent concealment rubric such that equitable estoppel will result? The courts have relied on
various types of information, including the identity of the defendant and
other facts vital to the plaintiffs' case. 224 Despite the wide net cast by equity,
the Tulsa court reduced the inquiry to whether victims of the riot would have
observed the city's misconduct during the riot.225 Not surprisingly, the court
answered this question in the affirmative, concluding that the injury was "ob226
vious" to riot victims at the time that it was inflicted.
The district court missed the point. The injury for which plaintiffs
sought relief was far greater and more sophisticated than a single tort-it
involved interrelationships that were not "obvious" until the publication of
the Commission Report. Equitable estoppel was therefore warranted.
2. Promise to Provide Restitution

The alternative ground for granting equitable estoppe

227

is where a de-

fendant has made some assurance reasonably calculated to lull plaintiff into
222 Id. at 135-36. The court seems to have permitted the plaintiffs to go forward under
both the equitable estoppel and equitable tolling doctrines, which often overlap.
223 Similarly, in Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 793 F.2d 304
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that where the government had fraudulently
"concealed the fact that there was no military necessity justifying the exclusion, evacuation, and
internment program" of Japanese Americans, plaintiffs' claims were considered timely because
of the concealment. Id. at 246, 250. But see Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,
467-68 (D.N.J. 1999) (concluding that alleged misrepresentations by Ford Motor Company
about its involvement in German slave labor during World War II did not toll the statutes of
limitations when the misstatements were made long after the end of the War). See also Klehr v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 194-96 (1997) (fraudulent concealment).
224 See Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cit. 1996) (identity of defendant
and other facts necessary for suit).
225 Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *26-28 (N.D.
Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257 (2005).
226 Id.

227 Although the plaintiffs in the Tulsa case did not argue that the defendants waived the
statutes of limitations, this is another available exemption. Defendants have waived statutes of
limitations in a variety of other reparations-type cases. The federal government did so in its
enactment of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 that compensated Japanese Americans for their
unlawful internment. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2000). The federal
government also waived the statutes of limitations in response to Pigford v. Glickman, a class
action brought against the Department of Agriculture on behalf of African-American farmers
and ranchers for lending discrimination. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C. 1999),
affd, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Where the Department's own study (the CRAT Report)
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not timely filing. In the Tulsa case, the plaintiffs argued that that assurance
228
was a promise by the City of Tulsa to provide restitution to the riot victims.
Shortly after the riot, the City promised it would "make good the damage, so
far as can be done, to the last penny. '229 The State of Oklahoma, in enacting
the 1921 Tlsa Race Riot Reconciliation Act of 2001, also acknowledged "its
moral responsibility" for the riot.230 The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
reliance on the City's promise could not be supported because the defendants
ultimately failed to provide restitution and instead tried to undermine the
plaintiffs' recovery and community rebuilding. 231 Consequently, equitable
232
estoppel was not granted.
But why should the defendants be able to benefit from their own deception, in contravention of the policies underlying the statute of limitations? It
does not follow that because the defendants eventually reneged on their
promise to provide restitution that the plaintiffs' initial reliance on that
promise was unreasonable. As the plaintiffs argued, the fact that the defendants gave conflicting messages does not mean that the plaintiffs did not reasonably rely on the defendants' assurances.
What is reasonable, of course, depends largely on the circumstances and
the actors. Here, where the court itself concluded that "[t]he political and
social climate after the riot simply was not one wherein the [p]laintiffs had a
true opportunity to pursue their legal rights, '233 it would be reasonablealthough certainly not ideal-to rely on the government or private entities to
provide some sort of restitution. Given the state of chaos, destruction, and
devastation during and immediately following the riot, the plaintiffs were certainly in no condition to accurately access the government's credibility-one
way or the other. The government's own culpability in the riot was not yet
established, and the government purported not only to the riot victims, but to
the rest of the world, that it was going to redress the plaintiffs' grievances.
revealed that African-American farmers and ranchers had been improperly denied loans and
that their complaints of such mistreatment had been routinely ignored or destroyed, the government waived the two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 88-89. Invoking the promise General
Sherman made to provide recently freed slaves "forty acres and a mule" and the Freedmen's
Bureau's relinquishment of that promise, the court endorsed the consent decree permitting
Black farmers relief long after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 85-86.
228 Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *28-29.
229 Tulsa, supra note 7, at 839.
230 Goble, supra note 1, at 15, 19 (acknowledging moral responsibility and recommending
reparations); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1.6 (West 2002):
The 48th Oklahoma Legislature ... recognizes that there were moral responsibilities at the time of the riot which were ignored and has [sic] been ignored ever since
rather than confront the realities of an Oklahoma history of race relations that
allowed one race to "put down" another race. Therefore, it is the intention of the
Oklahoma Legislature ... to freely acknowledge its moral responsibility on behalf
of the State of Oklahoma and its citizens that no race of citizens in Oklahoma has
the right or power to subordinate another race today or ever again.
Id.
231 Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *28-29.
232

Id. at *29.

233

Id. at *31.
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In the context of reparations litigation, the courts should grant wide latitude to the plaintiffs' claims of reasonable reliance on the defendants'
promises of restitution for wrongdoing. To do otherwise rewards the morally
bankrupt and undermines the credibility of limitations law.
D.

Equitable Tolling

Given the tremendous breadth of the application of the equitable tolling
doctrine, the court's constricted use of it in the Tulsa litigation is unjustified.
Ironically, the court recognized the unavailability of the courts and the plaintiffs' inability to access necessary information about their claims, 234 bases

normally sufficient to equitably toll the limitations period, but the court did
not toll the statute of limitations to the point of resurrecting the plaintiffs'
claims.
The difficult issue is determining at what point it becomes reasonable to
expect plaintiffs to bring reparations claims for a race riot that occurred over
three-quarters of a century ago. The court's opinion is instructive, but it
poses more questions than it answers.
Although the court recognized the propriety of equitable tolling where
plaintiffs could not, despite due diligence, obtain vital information bearing on
the existence of their claims, the court did not accept this as a basis for equitable tolling.2 35 The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they were
unaware of the role the City played in the riot and its aftermath until the
publication of the Commission Report and that therefore equitable tolling
was appropriate. 236 Relying on allegations in the complaint, the court concluded that because some riot victims sought relief before and some were
supposedly aware of specific city officials' violent acts, the plaintiffs were not
sufficiently diligent.237 This conclusion fails to take seriously the impact of
the defendants' campaign of misinformation and fraudulent concealment that
extended post-Jim Crow. With many adult survivors now dead and the riot
"swept well beneath history's carpet"-as recognized by the Oklahoma legislature itself 2 38 -the Commission Report made a challenge to the City and
State for restitution possible for the first time. Riot survivors today were
mere children when the riot occurred and could not realistically have been
expected to have had sufficient knowledge to file suit. 239 Litigation timely
234

235
236

Id. at *31-32.
See id. at *24-28.
Id. at *25-26. The court concluded:
Regardless of the legal theory relied on, equitable estoppel, equitable tolling, or
accrual, the gravamen of Plaintiffs' argument is that they did not and could not
know of the City's involvement any sooner. While it is certain that the Commission
Report has helped to gather more facts about the Riot, the Court has considerable
trouble with the Plaintiffs' assertion that until the Commission issued its report,
they were unaware of the City's responsibility for their injury.

Id.
237

See id. at *26-28.

238 OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 74, § 8000.1.4 (West 2002).

Cf Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that a plaintiff must have
"an awareness of sufficient facts to identify a particular cause of action," not "hints, suspicions,
hunches or rumors," to be required to file suit).
239
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brought by African-Americans shortly after the riot was substantially undercut by dismissals and a grand jury that exonerated only whites for their participation in the riot.2 40 These circumstances understandably discouraged
plaintiffs from filing suit.2 41 Finally, despite the groundbreaking work of the
Tulsa Commission and the significant contribution it has made to understanding the complicity of the City and State in the riot and its aftermath, the court
rejected the notion that the Commission Report's publication was a requisite
precursor to filing.242 Instead, the court held the plaintiffs to a standard far
beyond the reasonable person standard normally expected of plaintiffs.
The court's conception of what constitutes diligence sufficient to toll the
limitations period is unreasonable and out of sync with decisional law. For

240 The State of Oklahoma blamed African-American residents of Greenwood for the riot,
returning criminal indictments against several of them. See GrandJury Blames Negroes for Inciting Race Rioting; Whites Clearly Exonerated, supra note 161.
241 In a similar case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rightly held that the
statute of limitations for a wrongful death action had been tolled, even where the plaintiffs believed the defendant had committed the murder. See Allred v. Chynoweth, 990 F.2d 527, 531-32
(10th Cir. 1993). There, the circuit court equitably tolled the limitations period until the publication of the defendant's book, which admitted her guilt many years after her acquittal. Id. at 532.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs were sufficiently on notice of
their cause of action where the state found sufficient evidence to arrest and try the defendant
and the plaintiffs knew the victim had been murdered and suspected the defendant. Id. at
531-32. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs would not have had the incentive to
bring suit because the "jury's acquittal logically would have substantially undercut that suspicion,
if not eliminated it altogether." Id.
242 The major works on the Tulsa race riot preceding the Commission's Report did not
reveal the City and State's role in the riot and its aftermath. Ed Wheeler, described by Tulsa
Today as "the historical writer that in 1971 produced the first locally researched modem publication of the 1921 story," David Amett, Commission Completes FinalReport, TULSA TODAY, 1996,
http://www.tulsatoday.com/archive/racewar.htm, characterized the riot as a battle between Black
mobs and better armed white mobs. Ed Wheeler, It Happened in Tulsa, TULSA TODAY, 1996,
http://www.tulsatoday.com/archive/racewar.htm. Wheeler did not describe the role of the government in the violence, instead crediting white mobs for the "killing, looting and burning" of
the riot. Id.
Dr. Ellsworth, author of the preeminent work on the riot, Death in a Promised Land, conceded that "[w]hat little information about the riot that was available was inadequate and incomplete" prior to the Commission's Report. Declaration of Dr. Scott Ellsworth, appended to
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant City of Thlsa's Motion to Dismiss, Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1 at 3-4, Alexander v.
Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133-E (N.D. Okla. Feb. 23, 2004). Specifically:
[T]he Thlsa Race Riot Commission-and here I am speaking primarily of the scholars who were attached to it-began to produce a much larger body of information
about the riot than anyone, myself included, had anticipated. ...
All told, the overall effect of this new information was to help transform our
historical understanding of the riot ... [b]y using the newly uncovered historical
evidence in conjunction with previously available sources, one could now discern,
for the first time, not only the overall dynamics of the riot, but also how actions
taken by government authorities directly affected the fate of the African American
community.
Id. at 4-5; see also Goble, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that to write his accompanying report to the
final Commission Report, "Scott Ellsworth used evidence he did not have-no one had it-as
recently as 1982"). Moreover, resources such as the Internet, television documentaries, and
others were not available to Dr. Ellsworth when he published his book.
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example, in Rosner v. United States, 243 Hungarian Jews and their descendants
sought property expropriated by the pro-Nazi Hungarian government during
World War II and seized by the United States Army from the "Hungarian
Gold Train." 244 They sought information about the identification of their
property to no avail. 245 The plaintiffs contended that many of the facts in
their complaint did not come to light until the publication of the Presidential
2 46
Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets Report on the Gold Train.
Consequently, the district court tolled the limitations period on the ground
that the plaintiffs "could not have known about the facts giving rise to this
lawsuit. '247 Similarly, in Bodner v. Banque Paribas,248 Jewish descendants
sought damages from financial institutions who allegedly looted assets during
the Nazi occupation in France. 249 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants
engaged in a system of denial and misrepresentation about the custody of the
assets that made it "impossible for them to learn critical facts underlying
their claim. '250 The court equitably tolled the limitations period on the
ground that a reasonably prudent person could not have possibly learned or
discovered facts critical to the underlying claims. 251 Victims of the Tulsa race
riot, by contrast, were not afforded the same benefit of the reasonably prudent standard, and instead were expected to bring suit in the absence of information critical to their case.
The Tulsa case demonstrates how vulnerable the due diligence standard
is to discretionary abuse and caprice, but also demonstrates the federal judiciary's greater understanding of the historical reality and impact of the Jim
Crow era. Even assuming-contrary to the allegations in the complaintthat the plaintiffs had actual or presumed knowledge of the role of the government in the riot, the court recognized that the riot and its aftermath
presented extraordinary circumstances that warranted tolling the statute of
limitations until the end of the Jim Crow era in the 1960s.2 5 2 Although the
case was ultimately dismissed, the plaintiffs enjoyed a Pyrrhic victory-that
is, a tolling of the limitations period for over forty years. The enormity of
this achievement should not be undervalued. For the first time in a case
seeking restitution for damages incurred from a race riot, a court applied and
accepted the notion that the racial violence beset upon a community and the
ongoing institutionalized brutality in the decades that followed was sufficiently extraordinary to toll the limitations period. While recognizing the ex243 Rosner v. United States, 231 F.Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
244

Id. at 1203-04.

245 Id. at 1205.
246

Id.

Id. at 1205-06, 1209.
248 Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
249 Id. at 121. The Tulsa court acknowledged the applicability of the principles set forth in
Bodner. See Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *24-25
(N.D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257
(2005).
250 Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 135-36.
251 Id.
252 Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *30-32.
247
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treme complexity of applying the equitable doctrines of estoppel and
tolling, 53 the court's adoption of this scheme was unequivocal:
Plaintiffs assert extraordinary circumstances in a legal system that
was openly hostile to them, courts that were practically closed to their
claims, a City that blamed them for the Riot and actively suppressed
the facts, an era of Klan domination of the courts and police force,
and the era of Jim Crow. There is no question that there are exceptional circumstances here. Both the Commission Report and the
Legislative Findings and Intent resulting from that Report catalog
the horror and devastation of the Riot as well as the intimidation,
misrepresentation and denial that took place afterward. The political and social climate after the riot simply was not one wherein the
Plaintiffs had a true opportunity to pursue their legal rights. The
question is not a factual question of whether exceptional circum254
stances existed. They did.
Where the record was replete with evidence of "intimidation, fear of a
repeat of the riot, inequities in the justice system, Klan domination in the
courts, and the era of Jim Crow, '255 the court concluded that the environment was unconducive to timely filing. 256 The court thus tolled the limitations period for four decades-up to the dismantling of Jim Crow.
Application of the equitable tolling doctrine where such extraordinary
circumstances exist is consistent with similar decisional law. For example, in
the context of reparations claims for Holocaust-related violations, district
courts have equitably tolled the limitations period in part because of the exceptional nature of the circumstances. In Rosner, Hungarian Jews and their
descendants sued the government to recover property stolen by the pro-Nazi
257
government during World War II and seized by the United States Army.
The plaintiffs did not file until 1999, forty-six years after the limitations period expired. The district court conceded that what partially tipped the balance in favor of equitable tolling was the fact that "for the majority of
Plaintiffs, the years following World War II were particularly difficult. '258
The court was persuaded by the plaintiffs' contentions that the "brutal reality
of the Holocaust, and the resulting extraordinary circumstances that Plaintiffs were forced to endure" were important pieces of its equitable tolling
259
analysis.
Similarly, in Bodner, ancestors of Jewish customers brought suit against
French financial institutions for stealing the assets of customers during the
Nazi occupation and for failing to return the looted property.26° The plain261
tiffs did not file until 1997, seeking damages for claims over fifty years old.
253 Id. at *35-36.

254 Id. at *30-31 (emphasis added).
255 Id. at *32.
256 Id. at *31-32.

257 Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203-04 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
258 Id. at 1209.
259 See id. at 1208.
260 Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
261

See id. at 124.
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The district court permitted equitable tolling for various reasons, including
the extraordinary conditions under which the plaintiffs would have had to
function: "[P]laintiffs could hardly have been expected to bring these claims
at the end of World War 11."262
Additionally, in Hoang Van Tu v. Koster,263 residents of a Vietnam village sued American soldiers on behalf of the survivors and descendants of a
Vietnam War massacre. 264 Although the plaintiffs were not able to persuade
the appellate court to toll the statute of limitations for up to twenty-eight
years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized the potential legitimacy of "some degree of equitable tolling [as] appropriate on the
basis of plaintiffs' poverty, their status as subjects of a Communist govern'265
ment, the Vietnam War, and their inability to travel.
The Tulsa case suggests that the courts have come further in recognizing
the impact the confluence of racial violence, government corruption, and de
jure segregation has had on African-Americans' ability to timely file suit for
reparations, but this case also highlights the ever-dangerous slippery slope on
which everyone is purportedly terrified to fall down. Where do we draw the
line? At what point do the extraordinary circumstances cease to exist,
thereby forcing plaintiffs to file? In order to answer these questions, we must
identify what those circumstances were, whether they were in fact truly extraordinary, and what the implications of the answers to such questions are
for those seeking to procure restitution for past injury.
First, what is extraordinary? The court identified specific conditions that
impeded the plaintiffs from seeking legal recourse, 266 but there is no telling
whether any one of these factors alone or the confluence of them constituted
the "extraordinary." Certainly, had any one of them alone sufficed to exonerate the plaintiffs from timely suing, equitable tolling would arguably be
justified in a large number of cases. The court's identification of the circumstances that barred the plaintiffs from timely filing is clearly fact-driven and
case-specific, 267 but its findings may have broader appeal. Certainly, accounts of African-Americans being targeted for brutal racial violence and
then being prevented from pursuing meaningful legal recourse because of
"intimidation, misrepresentation and denial" resonate throughout American

262
263

Id. at 135.
Hoang Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 88

(2004).
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1199-1200.
266 The court identified "a legal system that was openly hostile to them, courts that were
practically closed to their claims, a City that blamed them for the Riot and actively suppressed
the facts, an era of Klan domination of the courts and police force, and the era of Jim Crow."
Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *30 (N.D. Okla. Mar.
19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257 (2005).
267 That is, it was a race riot (perhaps the worst in this country); there was a full investigation conducted that unearthed voluminous evidence, including that of government complicity;
there are specific live victims who personally experienced the violence who are seeking compensation today.
264
265
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history. The Tulsa case is, all at once, both extraordinary and completely
268
commonplace for Blacks living in America.
Second, what are the implications of deeming something extraordinary?
If the level of government complicity, racial violence, Klan domination, and
de jure segregation in Tulsa were tragically not so unique or extraordinary as
the plaintiffs contend, this may impact application of the equitable tolling
doctrine. If we accept that the confluence of factors in the Tulsa case was the
normal experience for many, if not most, African-Americans up to the end of
the Jim Crow era, this may mean that the statute of limitations should be
equitably tolled as a general matter for African-Americans seeking reparations for this time period. Or, it may mean that because African-Americans
share this common experience, it ceases to be extraordinary, and therefore,
does not warrant tolling. If we conclude that the Tulsa case was really an
aberration, this may mean that tolling is appropriate in this case but not elsewhere. Certainly, the more unique the Tulsa case, the more credible the argument that tolling is appropriate. However, such a finding-although
helpful for the plaintiffs in the Tulsa case-could harm similar race restitution cases in particular and the reparations movement in general. To the extent that the Tulsa case, or any other reparations case for that matter, is
distinguishable, it stands a chance at successfully tolling the limitations period. If it fails to set itself apart, however, it may trigger the slippery slope
contention.
Third, when do the extraordinary circumstances end? At what point did
the extraordinary circumstances in the Tulsa case cease to exist, thereby warranting the statute's running to resume? While acknowledging the devastating impact of the Tulsa race riot and its aftermath on the plaintiffs' ability to
timely bring a claim against the defendants, the court fell short of tolling the
limitations period beyond the dismantling of the Jim Crow laws. Relying on
the testimony of an expert witness, Dr. Leon Litwack, that the Jim Crow era
ended in the 1960s, 269 the court used this arbitrary date as the cutoff date for
extraordinary conditions.
As the plaintiffs argued, this line is much more blurry. The plaintiffs
contended that the brutality, fear, and denial that characterized the period
from 1921 to the 1960s in Tulsa did not immediately cease upon the dismantling of the de jure Jim Crow system. To the contrary, the plaintiffs argued
that these unfortunate circumstances-generally and in Tulsa specificallycontinued, thereby leaving the victims of the race riot with the reasonable
expectation that the judicial system would not be receptive to their claims
and that pressing such claims would be futile and possibly dangerous. 270 The
268 See Goble, supra note 1, at 19 ("The 1921 riot is, at once, a representative historical
example and a unique historical event.").
269 Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *32.
270 Tulsa blamed African-American community leaders such as A.J. Smitherman, J.B.
Stradford, and Charles T. Smithie for inciting the riot and unsuccessfully sought to extradite
them from other cities to which they fled for their lives; thousands of other Greenwood residents
fled. See, e.g., All Trains out of City Jammed with Refugees; Hundreds of Negroes Buy One-Way
Tickets out of Tulsa Agents Say, TULSA TRIB., June 5, 1921.
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plaintiffs' arguments notwithstanding, the court did not accept the ongoing
nature of such extraordinary circumstances.
The Tulsa case highlights the arbitrary and artificial nature of the extraordinary-conditions determination. Although the limitations period normally resumes once the filing obstacle has been removed-e.g., peace after
wartime 27 1 or the end of a brutal government regime 272-the model does not
fit in the context of reparations cases. What happens when the line of demarcation is not that stark-when there is no moment when "peace" is declared
or an oppressive regime is ousted from office? What if the oppressive conditions continue to exist on a more limited scale or the plaintiffs still suffer
from fear and intimidation long after the initial injury has occurred? In reparations cases, a more nuanced approach is warranted. There have clearly
been great strides made in the area of race relations and the justice system,
but this does not resolve the question of whether conditions are extraordinary enough to justify tolling. In the Tulsa case, for example, the plaintiffs
argued that the conditions that made it impossible for them to file pre-Jim
Crow bled over into the roughly thirty years that followed.
Finally, who gets to decide what constitutes extraordinary circumstances? Who should determine whether and when it is reasonable to seek
legal redress for racial violence? Whose voice, perspective, and experience
counts when determining whether conditions are so excessive that it is impossible for victims to vindicate their civil rights? Courts enjoy tremendous discretion to make such determinations, but perhaps they should borrow the
conceptual framework of the "eggshell skull defense '273 used in torts or the
related "reasonable woman" standard used in the sexual harassment context 274 and judge the propriety of equitable tolling from the vantage point of
the victim. The plaintiffs' arguments seem to hint at the adoption of such a
framework. The plaintiffs posit that even assuming that the level of intimidation, fear of racial violence, inequities in the justice system, Klan domination
in the courts, and Jim Crow discrimination diminished to the point of making
it more plausible that African-Americans would bring suit for past wrongs

271 See, e.g., Levy v. Stewart, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 244, 250, 255 (1870) ("[T]he right to sue
revives when peace is restored .... "); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 537, 539-41
(1867) ("[R]estoration of peace removes the disability, and opens the doors of the courts.").
272 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Given these
extraordinary conditions, any claims against Marcos for injury from torture, 'disappearance',
[sic] or summary execution were tolled until he left office in February 1986.").
273 See, e.g., Primm v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Corp., 922 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Ark. 1996) ("[The
eggshell plaintiff] rule embraces the principles that a tortfeasor must accept a plaintiff as he finds
him and may not escape or reduce damages by highlighting the injured party's susceptibility to
injury.").
274 See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide
divergence between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men ....
[U]nless the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts
are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in
this case, men.").
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in particular275 continued to labor under expost-Jim Crow, these plaintiffs
276
traordinary conditions.

Given that it was impossible for plaintiffs to successfully bring suit until
the publication of the Commission Report, equity demands that they be allowed to bring suit now. Shortly after the Civil War, the Supreme Court
recognized this connection between the limitations period and legal disability: "The law imposes the limitation and the law imposes the disability. It is
nothing, therefore, but a necessary legal logic that the one period should be

taken from the other. '277 Here, logic dictates that the court suspend the statute of limitations for that period of time where the courts were unavailable
and plaintiffs could not access information vital to bringing their claims. Until just recently, there has been no legal theory under which the plaintiffs
could seek reparations from the government.
V.

The Underlying Policy Rationales for Statutes of Limitations Are
Not Served by Time-Barring Reparations Cases

Regardless of whether the recent Tulsa reparations case fits within the
exemptions commonly used by the courts to permit the litigation of stale
claims, the case warrants consideration based on public policy. Even if the
court had not misapplied the statute of limitations exemptions, the court
could have entertained the litigation on the grounds that it is consistent with
the relevant underlying policy rationales of limitations law.278 The primary
275 See Caine, supra note 4, at 3 (noting the "profound and lasting effect" of the riot on
some of its victims today). The preeminent scholar on the Tulsa race riot, Dr. Ellsworth, has
concluded:
A half century after the riot, there were still plenty of black survivors who were
fearful even to merely discuss the riot. (And, indeed, as recently as 2001, a riot
survivor informed me that he was afraid that both he and his family would be punished for taking part in the lawsuit.).
Declaration of Dr. Scott Ellsworth, supra note 242, at 2-3; see also Franklin & Ellsworth, supra
note 163, at 25 ("Of course, any one who lived through the riot could never forget what had
taken place. And in Tulsa's African American neighborhoods, the physical, psychological, and
spiritual damage caused by the riot remained highly apparent for years. Indeed, even today
there are places in the city where the scars of the riot can still be observed.").
Similarly, in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
tolled the limitations period until the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, left office,
for persons bringing claims against him for injuries due to "torture, 'disappearance', [sic] or
summary execution." Hilao, 103 F.3d at 773. The Ninth Circuit credited plaintiffs' explanation
of fear and intimidation as appropriate grounds for tolling:
Another expert witness testified that many victims of torture in the Philippines did
not report the human-rights abuses they suffered out of intimidation and fear of
reprisals; this fear seems particularly understandable in light of testimony on the
suspension of habeas corpus between 1972 and 1981, and on the effective dependence of the judiciary on Marcos.

Id.
276 The problem, of course, is more complex when the concept is applied to those persons
who continue to labor under the extraordinary conditions of slavery and its aftermath.
277 Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 184-85 (1872).
278 See, e.g., Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 473-76 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that where underlying policies of statute of
limitations are not frustrated and settlement and reconciliation are enhanced, tolling should be
permitted).
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goals of ensuring fairness to the defendant, promoting efficiency, and bolstering institutional legitimacy are not undermined by permitting such claims.
A.

Fairness to the Defendant
Rather than ensuring fairness for the defendant, foreclosing reparations
claims because of untimeliness devalues fairness for the plaintiff.
1. Exposing Repose
The court's refusal to hear the Tulsa case as a means of providing repose
for defendants and society at large is unjustified. Providing peace of mind
and protecting a defendant's well-established expectations have been a hallmark of the Anglo-American legal system, 279 but very few have sought to
explain why. 280 Examining repose as a preeminent rationale for limitations
periods in reparations cases reveals its many shortcomings.
First, it is not at all clear why society should care more about satisfying a
defendant's settled expectations that he escape liability than a plaintiff's settled expectations that the legal system will hold wrongdoers accountable for
their misdeeds. Justice Holmes, in The Path of the Law, suggested that the
pull towards repose is human nature. 281 Relying on the law of adverse possession, Justice Holmes suggested that from a defense point of view, the defendant has gained a right that transcends, if not supplants, that of the
plaintiff. 282 The defendant's right stems from the intrinsic human act of selfpreservation and entitlement:
It is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed
and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your
resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came
by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest in283
stincts of man.
Certainly, claims for reparations have provoked deep resentment, defensiveness, and outright hostility. Mere discussion and research of the topic
and its impact engender rage and intolerance. 284 A corporation unjustly enriched by generations of cheap slave labor, a governmental system built on
279 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 460-61, 464 n.42 ("One of the fundamental
considerations of fairness recognized in every legal system is that settled expectations honestly
arrived at with respect to substantial interests ought not be defeated." (quotation omitted)); 1
WOOD, supra note 51, at 8-9 ("The underlying purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent the
unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have been thrown
off their guard by want of prosecution."); see, e.g., A'Court v. Cross, 130 Eng. Rep. 540, 541
(K.B. 1825) ("Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them.").
280 As Justice Holmes posed, "[Wlhy is peace more desirable after twenty years than
before?" Holmes, supra note 24, at 476.
281

Id. at 477.

Id. ("Has the defendant gained a right or not?... But if I were the defendant's counsel,
I should suggest that the foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked
for in the position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser.").
282

283

Id.

For example, U.S. Representative John Conyers has tried unsuccessfully for years to get
Congress to enact legislation that would merely study the issue of slavery and its impact and
284
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legally sanctioned discrimination, and many individuals unfairly privileged by
generations of racial favoritism 285 each hold onto their unmerited privilege as
an entitlement. Is this response simply the product of the "deepest instincts
of man" for which we cannot ask for more? Or is it possible to expect something greater? Even assuming that this sense of entitlement is intrinsically
human, this does not countenance designing legal principles to accommodate
a quality so base. Law is designed to establish rules that transcend instinctual
human behavior so that justice and order prevail.
As an initial matter, there is no reasonable expectation of repose by the
defendants in the Tulsa reparations litigation. In 1997, the defendants themselves commissioned the most comprehensive investigation of the Tulsa race
riot to identify its victims, determine culpability, and ascertain the propriety
of reparations, and then issued a report 286 whose findings were adopted by
the Oklahoma legislature. 287 The Commission Report clearly established the

moral responsibility of the City of Tulsa and the State of Oklahoma for their
wrongdoing. 288 What should follow is some measure of compensation for
that wrongdoing. Upon failing to provide restitution voluntarily, the defendants cannot credibly argue that they were caught by surprise or that their
settled expectations were altered when the plaintiffs shortly thereafter filed a

lawsuit to force the defendants to take legal responsibility for their moral
wrongdoing. Defendants should not be able to invoke repose as a defense
where their culpability has been established-using repose as a shield from
liability. Permitting such defense makes a mockery of the principle of repose. Had there been any expectation of repose, it was shattered by the defendants themselves.

Second, the erosion of repose in the context of criminal prosecutions for

civil rights violence 289 suggests that the same may be appropriate in the civil

context. Prosecutors have recently seen it fit to reopen numerous criminal
make recommendations regarding reparations. See Commission to Study Reparation Proposals
for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003).
285 These are not the only persons and entities that oppose reparations litigation. Some
African-Americans, for example, also oppose reparations for a variety of reasons, including: fear
that it will create a negative stigma, concern that it demonstrates dependence on the majority, a
preference for other means for redressing slavery and past discrimination, and concern over how
such a scheme would practically work. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 14, at 558 (arguing that the
"exclusive focus on slavery [by reparations litigators] is misguided" and proposing alternative of
focusing on lynchings and race riots of more recent past).
286 In 1997, Oklahoma House Joint Resolution 1035 initiated the creation of The 1921 Tulsa
Race Riot Commission. Goble, supra note 1, at 1. The Act was amended twice and enacted into
law on April 6, 2000. Id. The Commission's authority was extended to February 28, 2001. Id.
The Commission issued its report on February 28, 2001. Id.
287 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1 (West 2002).
288 See supra note 10.
289 The victims' rights movement also suggests that many in society-at least in the criminal
context-have grown weary of defendants' interests predominating the legal system. See Ogletree, supra note 13, at 1058. The notion of providing repose for the defendant as justification for
depriving plaintiffs the opportunity to seek restitution may be waning. Ochoa and Wistrich
conclude:
In assessing the validity and weight of this purpose ... it is necessary to ask how
much value should be placed on the desire of wrongdoers, or of persons who are
uncertain whether they are wrongdoers, for freedom from worry about being called
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cases involving civil rights violence perpetrated decades ago. 290 If in criminal
law, where the stakes for finding a defendant guilty are much greater-i.e., a
defendant could lose his freedom or even his life291-society has thought it
appropriate to entertain stale claims, why shouldn't the same be true in the
civil context? Finally, prioritizing repose wrongly protects and deflects
American society from the critical and difficult job of coming to terms with
the historical and current oppression of African-Americans. Recognition
and reconciliation have not and will not take place until they replace repose
as a preeminent value. Not even masked in language of restoration or healing for plaintiffs, some argue that plaintiffs seeking restitution for past acts of
racial violence need to just "get over it.''292 The opposition contends that the
such avoidance entopic is too divisive and painful to deal with; however,
293
courages not repose for defendants, but amnesia.
2.

Putting Evidentiary Problems into Perspective

Reparations cases present significant evidentiary problems, but it is important to put these problems into perspective. The difficulty and complexity
of identifying plaintiffs, defendants, causation, and damages so remote in
time is unquestionably daunting. 294 Yet, it is important to ask ourselves
to account for past misdeeds. Currently, society appears to place relatively little
value on such considerations.
Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 461 (emphasis added); see Russell, supra note 17, at
1227-47; see also Bibas, supra note 192, at 2466 ("Thieves deserve no repose from the rightful
owner's claim.").
290 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (2003); Todd Taylor, Exorcising the Ghosts of a Shameful Past. The Third Trial and Conviction of Byron de la
Beckwith, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359, 359 (1996). Disrupting repose also works to help
defendants. The Innocence Project is a case in point. In an effort to protect the innocent, there
has been a groundswell of support for reopening cases where DNA or other evidence suggests
that a defendant was wrongly convicted.
291 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, I., concurring). The Court
recognized this critical distinction between the criminal and civil context:
In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages ... we view it as no
more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's
favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor .... In a
criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the social disutility of convicting
an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.
Id.
292 See John McWhorter, supra note 14, at 36-37; Epstein, supra note 14, at 1192; Ogletree,
supra note 13, at 1054-55 ("The victims' families and communities are told to 'get over it,' even
by the citizens of the towns still traumatized by their history of racial and ethnic violence as well
as by black and white critics of reparations around the country."); HoRowrrz, supra note 20, at
14; Horowitz, supra note 20; see also Brophy, supra note 20, at 1201-02 (categorizing the arguments opposing reparations).
293 See Leon F. Litwack, Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow, appended to Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendant City of Tulsa's Motion to Dismiss, Alternative Motion for Summary
Judgment and Brief in Support, at Exhibit 15, Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133-E (N.D.
Okla. Jan. 6, 2004) ("It has been far easier to take refuge in historical amnesia, as Americans
chose to do for much of the twentieth century, and not view these experiences as part of our
heritage.").
294 That the evidentiary issues in reparations cases are difficult to surmount does not mean
that such cases should be abandoned altogether. Other types of massive litigation, such as those
involving asbestos and tobacco, have also posed daunting evidentiary challenges. Where the
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whether the Supreme Court was correct when it stated more than a century
ago: "[Tlime is constantly destroying the evidence of rights. ' 295 Although
experience and logic suggest that the answer is yes,2 96 the answer within the
context of reparations claims is more nuanced.
First, the presumption that evidence is less reliable over time in the context of reparations cases is not necessarily true. This is because statutes of
limitations are overinclusive: they ban not only those claims that are based on
inaccurate factual findings, but those claims based on accurate ones as well.
297
Wood v. Carpenter concludes that the "bane and antidote go together.
But does a statute of limitations remedy the problem of deteriorating evidence? Do prohibiting a lawsuit from going forward and preventing inaccurate fact finding "go together"? Not necessarily. 298 Some meritorious claims
thus are barred by what is inevitably an arbitrary cutoff. The limitations bar
does not neatly divide claims into those based on accuracies and inaccuracies.
Its efficacy as a means of protecting evidence is crude at best.
Critical to the inquiry is the type of evidence under consideration. For
example, testimonial evidence-although subjected to the ravages of
time 299-may be more forthcoming today than it would have been in the
past. The passage of time itself may heal wounds that enable victims to overcome suppressed memories and their fear of coming forward. Additionally,
the greater the distance from the events themselves, the easier it may be for
defendants to disclose their involvement without having to take personal and
direct responsibility for the wrongdoing. The passage of time may be healing
and cathartic, allowing the parties to articulate the unspeakable.
The passage of time has resulted in circumstances that make it much
more likely that reliable evidence will surface. The creation of impartial, bipartisan investigative commissions has unearthed long-buried evidence and
jogged collective memories. The very existence of investigative commissions
and a legal system committed to eradicating at least the most egregious forms
of de jure civil rights violations may resurrect testimonial evidence. Certainly, within the criminal context, aggressive and reinvigorated investigajudiciary has taken creative, albeit controversial, approaches to such litigation, the legal system
has been able to provide relief. See Weinstein & Schwartz, supra note 92, at 379-85.
295 See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
296 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 474-75; see also Epstein, supra note 62, at 1181
("With the passage of time, the evidence available regarding a given legal issue necessarily becomes stale."); Letsou, supra note 62, at 227 ("The passage of time magnifies uncertainty and
evidentiary problems."); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand
JudicialAdministration,2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 446 (1973) ("Court delay increases error costs...
because evidence decays over time, increasing the probability of an erroneous decision.").
297 Wood, 101 U.S. at 139.
298 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 477 ("Limitation of actions is a rather blunt
instrument for ensuring accuracy."); Callahan, supra note 23, at 134 (concluding that given that
statutes of limitations bar "good" claims based on accurate facts as well as "bad" ones, the
preservation of evidence is not a justification for such statutes).
299 Despite the passage of time, "hundreds and hundreds ... tell us that what happened in
1921 in Tulsa is as alive today as it was back then. What happened in Tulsa stays as important
and remains as unresolved today as in 1921." Goble, supra note 1, at 4.
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tions of civil
rights murders have led to new convictions or confirmation of
300
prior ones.
Other evidence-although not contemporaneous to Jim Crow violence-may be reliable despite the passage of time. With major advances in
modern technology, communications, and science-such as the computer, Internet, and DNA testing-it is easier to collect, record, and preserve evi-

dence than ever before. Witnesses, whose general longevity has increased,
may be found through computer search engines and contacted by cellular
phone, facsimile, or e-mail. Persons can be identified positively through
DNA testing and genealogy records. Such advances have enabled prosecutors today to successfully pursue those responsible for some of the most notorious and well-known acts of civil rights violence. It is thus important to
recognize that there are times when evidence, like a fine wine, improves over
1
time.

30

Second, even assuming that issues such as the identification of plaintiffs,
defendants, causation, and damages in reparations cases cannot be determined with absolute certainty, it is important to recognize that the legal system often provides at best "rough justice." On the one hand, it seems
obvious that the more accurate the fact finding the better. 30 2 Accurate fact
finding in the legal system accomplishes important objectives: the guilty are
punished and the innocent exonerated; accurate adjudication deters misconduct; and the legal system is legitimized. 30 3 On the other hand, although ac30 5
curacy is a laudable goal,30 4 it is often neither attained nor attainable.

Decision making based on perfect information is admittedly aspirational. 30 6
The Anglo-American legal system is arguably designed to play the limited
role of resolving disputes, as opposed to determining truth.307 This reality is
reflected in the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in civil cases.

Plaintiffs are charged with convincing the fact finder that it is more likely
than not that their version of the facts is true, not that their version is absoSee supra note 290 and accompanying text.
See also Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 475 (noting that claims based primarily on
documentary evidence may survive the passage of time); Green, supra note 54, at 989-1003
(arguing that in toxic tort cases, statutes of limitations diminish the accuracy of fact finding because they require claims to be filed prematurely-before adequate scientific data showing causation is developed, before the plaintiff has suffered significant loss, and before it is possible to
assess the course of the plaintiff's condition).
302 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 472 n.80 ("The degree of accuracy is a central
concern of adjudication." (quotation omitted)); Daniel R. Ortiz, Neoactuarialism:Comment on
Kaplow (1), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 403 (1994) ("Accuracy is a central, if not the central, value of
adjudication."); Stephen McG. Bundy, Valuing Accuracy-Filling Out the Framework:Comment
on Kaplow (2), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 433 (1994) ("Accuracy is a central aspiration of any
procedural system, but it cannot be the only aspiration.").
303 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 472-73.
304 Some argue that accuracy is more important in certain types of civil cases than others.
See, e.g., Bundy, supra note 302, at 431 (identifying civil rights, torts, and employment cases as
those where accuracy is paramount because of a defendant's "hazy sense of how much harm they
are doing").
305 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 473.
306 See id.
307 See id. at 473 n.87 ("Of course, the principal purpose of the legal process is not to obtain
correct answers; it is to resolve disputes." (quotation omitted)).
300
301
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lutely true. In cases where plaintiffs seek a group remedy, such as class actions and other aggregate litigation, our legal system regularly provides
"rough justice." The argument for a group remedy in reparations cases has
been made persuasively by others.30 8 Certainly, the judiciary's overwhelming
encouragement of settlements of mass litigation-which are by definition
massive compromises-illustrates the legal system's tolerance, if not endorsement, of "rough justice" outcomes. To the extent that the legal system is
already limited in its capacity to determine the truth, maximizing the accuracy of fact finding is critical. 30 9 But once that maximization has occurred, it
behooves the court at that point to provide some measure of relief.
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court concluded that where evidence
is destroyed by the ravages of time, a presumption in favor of the defendant
should result. 310 Wood concluded that mere delay should result in a conclusive bar.311 In the context of reparations claims, however, the potential inability to obtain the most accurate evidence should not foreclose a cause of
action altogether. Rather than providing fairness to the defendant, such an
outcome would only result in unfairness to the plaintiff. It is better for the
judiciary to provide "rough justice" than no justice at all.
3. CurtailingPlaintiff Misconduct
Although a statute of limitations purports to provide fairness to the defendant by curtailing plaintiff misconduct, it is not obvious that in reparations
cases such a statute prevents plaintiff fraud, promotes diligence, or ensures
an equal playing field between the parties. First, those opposing tolling fear
that plaintiffs will inflate their injuries and fraudulently identify themselves
as victims and, therefore, beneficiaries of reparations litigation. It is not
clear, however, that a plaintiff's incentive and ability to commit fraud is deterred by limitations law. Some scholars have suggested that other mechanisms may more effectively curtail plaintiff misconduct and prevent the
admission of unreliable evidence. 312 It is also unclear whether the defendant
would not be equally tempted to commit fraud in the absence of a limitations
period. There is nothing to suggest that, upon being sued, a defendant would
not also resort to fabricating evidence. A defendant might fraudulently deny
itself as a party, diminish its involvement in the plaintiff's injury, or devalue
the injury itself. There is no reason to believe that a defendant's evidence
would escape the ravages of time any more than a plaintiff's. 3 13 Limitations
law may thus fail to curtail fraudulent behavior by either party. In any event,
in the Tulsa case, where the plaintiffs are live victims of the race riot or their

310

See generally Russell, supra note 17.
See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 473.
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).

311

Id.

308
309

See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 480; Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, supra note 22, at 1186. For example, some scholars contend that measures such as
the parol evidence rule, statute of frauds, and strict evidence rules may better address concerns
about fraud. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 480; Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, supra note 22, at 1186.
313 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 480.
312
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direct descendants, and the defendants have conceded culpability in the riot,
concerns about fraudulent identity are greatly diminished.
Second, those opposing tolling statutes of limitations fear that in the absence of such temporal restrictions, plaintiffs will be dilatory in bringing their
claims. It is unclear whether barring a plaintiff from seeking recovery is a
sensible punishment for dilatory conduct. Professor Ochoa and Judge Wistrich suggest that it is not, because denying an innocent plaintiff the right to
vindicate his rights would unfairly give the guilty defendant a windfall.314
This is hardly good policy. Instead, they propose other types of punishment
315
for the plaintiff, such as making him forfeit his damages to charity.
Statutes of limitations are also a poor deterrent of plaintiff misconduct
where the plaintiff is unaware of her potential claim. 316 Under such circumstances, a punitive approach does nothing to encourage diligence. For example, in the Tulsa case, the plaintiffs had no way of knowing or fully
understanding their claims until the release of the Commission Report. The
court makes much ado over the fact that a small minority of plaintiffs actually
brought claims contemporaneous with the Tulsa riot. The judiciary may want
to encourage plaintiffs to overcome their adverse circumstances and pursue
their rights in a timely manner, but it should not expect them to overcome
such extraordinary circumstances in order to enjoy the protection of the law.
Finally, the notion that limitations law is necessary to ensure that plaintiffs do not have an unfair advantage over defendants in the preservation of
evidence is inapplicable here. Where a plaintiff is unaware of a potential
claim, there is no risk that the plaintiff will deprive defendants of notice of
the lawsuit. If both parties are ignorant of the potential claim, they may be
equally vulnerable to the risk of evidence deterioration over time. 317 Under
these circumstances, the plaintiff may suffer more because he bears the primary burden of proof.318 More important, if the plaintiff is ignorant of his
potential claim, and the defendant is knowledgeable, the defendant is in a
superior position. 319 In this situation, the defendant has the opportunity to
preserve helpful evidence (or worse, destroy unhelpful evidence) for his defense, thereby allowing the plaintiff's evidence to deteriorate and her concomitant claim to die.
Id. at 491.
See id. at 492.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 486. Where both parties are aware of a potential claim, they can both take measures to preserve evidence. Id.
318 See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543 n.12 (1989) (noting that an open-ended tolling
provision would not result in plaintiffs frequently filing claims based on antiquated events because plaintiff bears burden of proof).
319 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 486-87. Rather than the plaintiff being perceived as the knowledgeable party, hoarding evidence and lying in wait to sue the unsuspecting
and ill-prepared defendant, just the opposite may be true. In the cases of a corporate or institutional defendant, it may be accustomed to being sued. As a "repeat player," the defendant may
hoard evidence for its benefit and lie in wait for ill-informed plaintiffs to let the statute of iimitations expire. The advantages repeat players have in the context of alternative dispute resolution
and settling cases are well known.
314
315
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Whether society should condone, if not promote, such defendant misconduct has been the subject of concern. 320 Where a principal goal of limitations law-equalizing the playing field between the parties-is not served
conbecause the defendant has notice of a potential claim, some courts have
321
tended that the statute of limitations should be liberally construed.
Application of this principle to the Tulsa case favors the plaintiffs being
able to pursue claims remote in time. For example, the defendants were admittedly aware of the plaintiffs' potential claims and worked hard to conceal
them. The defendants' efforts were in large measure successful. To the extent that the plaintiffs were unaware of their potential claims-an argument
the plaintiffs persuasively make-and the defendants were aware of those
claims, the playing field tipped in favor of the defendants. Under this scenario, "the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and ... a liberal
'322
rule should be applied.
B.

Promoting Efficiency

Although statutes of limitations generally promote efficiency in our legal
system, this is not necessarily so for reparations cases. First, the presumption
that transaction costs are greater the more remote in time a cause of action is
does not necessarily hold true for reparations litigation. The costs of tracking
down documents, witnesses, and other reliable evidence in such cases are
indeed high, as evidenced by the amount of money the Tulsa Commission
spent on its investigation and report, but there is no telling what they would
have been in 1921. Given the lengths to which evidence was covered up and
the extent to which the legal system was corrupted and co-opted by the Ku
Klux Klan and others, contemporaneous litigation would have encountered
its own significant evidentiary challenges. Controlling for inflation, it is not
obvious that the costs associated with these evidentiary concerns would have
been significantly less than those incurred today.
Second, although limitations law is a procedural mechanism that may
curtail courts' burgeoning dockets, 323 this modem justification for its application is weak, especially in the context of reparations cases. Smaller docketsalthough a beneficial byproduct of limitations periods-should not drive
courts to deprive plaintiffs of their substantive rights. Given the tiny fraction
of cases involving reparations claims, barring such cases because of limitations periods would have a nominal effect on the federal judiciary's caseload.
Third, the notion that limitations law reduces undesirable claims because
stale claims are more likely to be meritless is suspect.324 The premise for this
belief-that a plaintiff is more likely to timely file a claim if she believes it is
strong and important-is unfounded in the reparations context. 325 There are
See, e.g., id. at 486-87.
See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
322 Id.
323 See, e.g., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 481 (1986) (noting that the statute of
limitations is also designed "to move cases to speedy resolution in a bureaucracy").
324 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 23, at 498.
325 It is also unfounded in other cases where people have been seriously victimized. For
example, the propriety of limitations periods is being examined in the context of rape and child
320
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numerous reasons why a plaintiff seeking relief for damages resulting from a
race riot might delay litigation, or eschew it altogether. As discussed above,
certainly the physical, material, and psychological devastation of being assaulted, having your home burned to the ground, or watching a parent get
shot and killed-at the hands of not only individuals but the government
itself-would potentially disable anyone from timely filing a lawsuit. This
"disability"-although not recognized as a legal one-operates as effectively
as a formally recognized incapacity. 326 Tremendous fear and intimidation
shortly thereafter would also explain why victims would delay filing suit; indeed, some victims of the Tulsa race riot remain fearful of the possible repercussions for giving deposition testimony and speaking out.327 Ignorance of
the requisite facts for bringing a cause of action and false assurances by the
responsible parties that relief will be provided also may delay timely filing.
Victims of the Tulsa race riot allege that they did not have sufficient knowledge of their cause of action until publication of the Commission Report and
that the government had lulled them into not filing earlier by promising it
would voluntarily provide restitution. 328 These conditions-alone or considered separately-explain why the courts should not use timeliness as a proxy
for merit when determining whether reparations claims should be timebarred.
Finally, statutes of limitations are efficient because they provide a cutoff
date for barring claims, but the courts exercise sufficient discretion to undermine the certainty that such a cutoff might provide. The nature of reparations litigation requires the courts to carefully and seriously scrutinize the
applicability of equity principles and the exemptions doctrines. In the Tulsa
case alone, litigation over the limitations issue has been going on for yearsreplete with discovery, hearings, and full briefings. Both the federal district
court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have issued opinions on this
329
crucial topic.
In sum, an efficiency rationale fails to adequately justify barring reparations claims that are brought after the statute of limitations has expired.
C. Bolstering Institutional Legitimacy

One of the most important, yet unspoken, rationales for statutes of limitations is legitimization of the legal system. Courts are not permitted to exercise unfettered discretion, but instead are checked by clear boundaries
embodied in limitations law. Dismissal of reparations cases thus may simply
demonstrate a reasonable application of the time bars established by the legabuse. Because of the degree of trauma, victims with valid claims may not come forward until
years after the limitations period has expired.
326 See, e.g., Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004) (disabilities include competency and age), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257 (2005).
327 See Caine, supra note 4, at 3-4 (noting the "profound and lasting effect" of the riot on
some of its victims today).
328 See supra Part IV.C.
329 See Alexander, 382 F.3d at 1206 (affirming district court's dismissal on statute of limitations grounds); Alexander v. Oklahoma, 391 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying en banc
review), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257 (2005).
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islature. The problem with this reasoning is that it fails to properly contextualize the plaintiffs' claims. The purported absurdity of seeking relief for
claims so old is dissipated when one considers why it is that such claims are
being brought now. The reasons the plaintiffs have chosen to file suit recently (like all plaintiffs) are varied and complicated, 330 but they all stem
from the fact that the prior timely attempts of the plaintiffs' predecessors
were unsuccessful, through no fault of their own. There would be no need
for the plaintiffs to seek redress now, had restitution been initially provided.
Some African-Americans immediately sought relief in the aftermath of the
Tulsa race riot to no avail. It is no wonder that such efforts were unsuccessful, as the courts were unavailable to the plaintiffs at that time-a reality the
court conceded. 331 Taken within context, it is reasonable that the plaintiffs
would only seek reparations now.
The validity of the legal system is also undermined by the court's recent
dismissal of the case because it grants guilty defendants a windfall to the
detriment of blameless plaintiffs. The Tulsa government conceded its failure
to protect its citizens from mob violence and even admitted to participating
in it-leaving up to three hundred dead, thousands homeless, and many businesses destroyed. 332 The victims of the Tulsa race riot were assured restitution by the government in the aftermath of the riot. The district court and
Tenth Circuit concluded respectively that, following the riot, the courts were
unavailable to the riot victims and the circumstances so extraordinary that
the plaintiffs could not have possibly brought suit until at least the 1960s,
with the dismantling of Jim Crow, or as late as 1982, with the publication of
Death in a Promised Land.333 The most comprehensive and exhaustive study
of the Tulsa race riot, which for the first time disclosed to riot victims the full
nature and scope of their legal claims, was not published until 2001. 334 Consequently, the plaintiffs timely filed for restitution two years 335 after the publication of the Commission's Report. The injustice of the Tulsa circumstances
is unsettling.
The legitimacy of the legal system is also undermined by the court's ahistorical and unrealistic expectations of the plaintiffs-as victims of government-sanctioned extreme racial violence and discrimination-to pursue
litigation shortly after the "injury" occurred. The court diminishes the nature
and scope of the injury by parsing out individual tort-related injuries, as opposed to recognizing the systemic nature of the violation. The extraordinary
nature of the Jim Crow era and its troubling legacy today warrant a different
approach to traditional litigation. The legitimacy of a legal system that pur330 They may range from strategic, to political, to psychological, to practical, to circumstantial, or a combination of them all.
331 Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-C-133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *30-32 (N.D.
Okla. Mar. 19, 2004), affd, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2257 (2005).
332 See Goble, supra note 1, at 11-13, 16; see also O'Dell, supra note 152, at 144.
333 Alexander, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *30-32; Alexander, 382 F.3d at 1216-20.
334 The Commission Report conceded that Scott Ellsworth's book in 1982, Death in a
PromisedLand, was only a quarter the size of his accompanying report to the Commission Report and contained far less evidence than what is available today. Goble, supra note 1, at 8.
335 It is undisputed that Oklahoma's two-year statute of limitations applies. See Alexander,
382 F.3d at 1215.
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ports to value every citizen's right to be heard and the equal protection of the
laws, but fails to adhere to such values when the implications are most
profound, must be called into question. Foreclosing reparations claims because of untimeliness inappropriately elevates procedural norms over the
336
pursuit of just outcomes.
Although limitations law is designed to curb judicial discretion and inoculate decisions from bias, such law does not forbid courts from applying (or
failing to apply) equitable doctrine in a biased manner. There exists a collective blind spot when it comes to understanding the residual and ongoing effects of the legacy of Jim Crow violence on society as a whole. It is
fundamentally unfair that the courts regretfully eschew reparations claims as
beyond the scope of their mandate and pass it on to the legislature, 337 and the
legislature responds with an equal unwillingness to consider the issue. 338
Consequently, there is no relief for the victims and their descendents for
some of the most profound human rights violations in this country's history.
VI.

Conclusion

In the context of reparations claims, it is time for the courts to take a
different approach to the equitable tolling doctrines of statutes of limitations.
Reparations claims push the concepts of statutes of limitations and equitable
tolling doctrine to their outer edge. Where the claims are so horrendous they
cry out for equitable relief and yet so remote in time they seem insurmountable, the legal system must reexamine the underlying policies of statutes of
limitations and recognize when they are not being served.

336 See Russell, supra note 17, at 1225-27, 1258-59. Although there has not been any legislative alteration of the applicable statute of limitations, a few congressional representatives have
been receptive to hearing the plaintiffs' argument for tolling in this case.
337 Cf Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947) ("Remedies for resulting inequities are
to be provided by Congress, not the courts."); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 275-76
(1957).
338 See supra note 284.

